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EVALUATION OF THE USAID PEACE-BUILDING PROGRAM IN CASAMANCE AND SUB-REGION



June 1, 2006

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The evaluation team would like to thank the USAID Mission, the liaison staff in the field, and the personnel of the implementing partners, for their support and patience over the course of our visit. We hope our findings will be useful to the aims of the program.

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Key Findings

Introduction

The evaluation was tasked to assess the extent to which USAID programs in Casamance (Senegal) had a verifiable mitigation impact on the conflict in the region. USAID objectives were to support enabling conditions for peace.

The evaluation used a combination of conflict mapping workshops, direct observation, interviews, and document review. We undertook two field visits, covering Gambia, Casamance, and the border region of Guinea Bissau.

We find that the key drivers of the conflict have developed over time starting with setting up of artificial borders by the former colonial powers, the physical isolation of the region, a perception of threatened geographically based cultural and religious identities, conflicts on land tenure and use, perceived lack of investment by the Government of Senegal in the region.

As the conflict escalated other conflict drivers emerged such as increasing economic impoverishment, the prevalence of small arms and anti-personnel mines and the fragmentation of chains of command among rebel groups.

The drivers of peace have been the exhaustion of the population, the reconstruction of villages, the development of civil society, and in a limited way the reduced logistical isolation of Casamance. Good living conditions and the proximity of refugees to areas of origin have to some extent facilitated repatriation.

USAID Intervention

USAID addressed key issues such as reconstruction of villages, building economic livelihood and capacity building of civil society within the limited room for manoeuvre it enjoyed at the planning stage.

USAID allocated US\$13.2 million from 1999 to 2005 under two separate special programs, called the Casamance Special Objective (Sp02) in the bilateral Senegal mission and the Conflict Special Objective (Sp07) in the West African Regional Program (WARP), targeting socio-economic causes to the conflict and improving interactions between parties to conflicts. The regional program (WARP) was used to support assistance for refugees.

Impact Assessment

The programs have been divided into five components by the evaluation team: it effectively includes reconstruction of community infrastructure, building of economic livelihood, health, mine awareness/action, and conflict resolution on local and political level. Each component has been rated by the evaluators according to relevance, extent and duration of the impact on the conflict dynamic.

1. Reconstruction scores highly on significance to the contribution to peace. This is because houses and small infrastructure are key to normal living conditions. However performance is limited by a high public perception of mine risk, and failure to continue reconstruction work after 2006;
2. Rebuilding economic livelihoods is very relevant to the conflict. However as carried out by USAID it is too thinly spread and too focused on micro-finance, to be effective in enabling the populations to break out of the geographic enclaves and poverty;
3. Health rehabilitation has only an indirect link to the conflict, as the impact was of uncertain duration and extent, in spite of a clearly high degree of effectiveness of some activities such as the Handicap International assistance to mine victims and mine risk education;
4. Conflict resolution at the community level is very significant. It could have however been more so had the program tackled a key issue such as ownership of land;
5. Conflict resolution at the political level is more difficult to assess, because of the turnover of personnel involved among state actors and because of the inability to include the key persons among the rebels. The impact is seen as average.

Effectiveness and Efficiency

The programs combined in an effective manner reconciliation work and a broader development recovery dimension. Our assessment of these developmental outcomes (made in terms of their ability to meet sector objectives), notes commendable results in mine awareness, reconstruction, and income generation. Results were weaker for health and the refugee program in Guinea Bissau.

Efficiency of programming is strong at the local level thanks to high ownership by stakeholders and good program staff monitoring. Many local level reconciliation processes, and a return to conditions of normality, were effectively supported. It is more limited at the strategic level because of the inability to cover new needs, and the lack of mid-term evaluations and strategic analysis of events and context. The program did not cover some key drivers such as land tenure and use, de-mining, and better understanding and use of decentralization mechanisms.

The USAID contracting modalities generated rigidities in the design by setting obligations in terms of amounts and results to be achieved very early on, when in fact the conflict required a lot of adaptation.

Lessons Learned

The region still needs external assistance and investments in economic, social and political development to consolidate nascent peace. With its own distinct culture and opportunities, Casamance offers an important contrast with the broader dynamics of conflict and peace in the country and in the region, and as such deserves to be better assisted.

The direction the mission should take in its future programming is to strengthen the definition of those ‘drivers’ of peace or conflict it wants to target. This can be supported for program accountability purposes, on the one hand through a periodic process of situation monitoring, and through a staged mobilization of resources, to address possible shortfalls and new needs as these emerge.

For the mission/institution to manage a conflict program more effectively it needs to focus in a more detailed manner on the way in which the program is appropriated at the local level. This local orientation may reflect a different definition of priorities, for example defined in geographical rather than sectoral terms, or it may reflect a greater importance given to certain sectors, such as rebuilding social capital (conflict resolution, communication) and infrastructure (houses, roads). This should be capitalized upon as an asset to increase ownership and hence mobilization and efficiency.

The evaluation team sees as the main strength of the USAID design and management of the Casamance program the creation of an overall strategy made of two programs including different modalities and agencies, facilitated by high level diplomatic leverage. The ability to monitor developments at the local level is a strength in the case of the Senegal mission.

We conclude that the results based management used by USAID must be counterbalanced by a progressive definition of results, linked to conflict drivers, for a conflict program where circumstances and objectives can change suddenly.

We would recommend the following steps in the future for Casamance:

- USAID and the US Embassy in Senegal should continue to play an important role as facilitators, emphasizing more political and cross-border aspects of the conflict dynamics.
- USAID should address the drivers of the conflict previously not sufficiently addressed which are contributing to the ongoing instability: cross-border exchanges, elimination or marking of anti-personnel mines, housing, public information. The economic incentives for demobilization also require more identification, in a first stage, and subsequent support.

- USAID needs to stand firm on its own agenda of careful local planning and adjustment as a precondition for long term development, even when more political initiatives are combined with its activities.
- Tasks should be allocated according to a logic which is either related to assigning objectives to a driver of the conflict, or to a geographical region.
- USAID should make a priority out of supporting the decentralization process as a means of achieving more local control. This could include not only the provision of financial resources, but the twin services of technical programming advice, and financial controls.
- Land tenure issues should be addressed through development of a governance component dealing with land registration, access to justice for rural populations, and possible compensation schemes in cases of irreconcilable differences between customary and national law on these issues.
- USAID should capitalize on the new wealth of local grass root organizations to carry out community level peace-building.
- USAID should carry out periodic conflict impact reviews aside from normal results reporting, focusing on drivers of conflict.
- A phased program has to be ensured at the outset when selecting partners and activities. Proposals and subsequent agreements should be reviewed under a single broad (secured) financial allocation, detailed enough to give USAID a good indication of expected results as these evolve.
- More strategic management would occur if USAID gave funding in phases where implementation priorities are identified and in-depth dialogue with the implementing partner is encouraged.

List of abbreviations and acronyms

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AJAEIDO	Association des jeunes agriculteurs et éleveurs du département de Ossouye
AJAC-APRAN	Association des jeunes agriculteurs de la Casamance – Association pour la promotion rurale de l’arrondissement de Nyassia (a Ziguinchor NGO)
ASACASE	Association sénégalaise pour l’appui à la création d’activités socioéconomiques
CACEC	Collectif d’associations et de cabinets d’études en Casamance
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IP	Implementing Partner
IR	Intermediate Result
MFDC	Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PMP	Performance Monitoring Plan
PROCAS	Programme d’appui au développement socio-économique pour la paix en Casamance
RF	Results Framework
SoW	Scope of Work
SpO	USAID Special Objective Program in Casamance and sub region (refers to both the country program SpO 2 and the regional program WARP SpO7)
STI	Sexually Transmitted Infections
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN Children’s Fund
USAID	US Agency for International Development

1. Introduction

The purpose of this evaluation, as presented in the Scope of Work (SoW) (see annex 1), is to identify the program impact of the USAID/Senegal Casamance Special Objective (SpO2)¹ and the USAID/West Africa Regional Program (WARP) Conflict Special Objective (SpO7) on achieving peace in the Casamance region. In the report we will refer to these various components as the Casamance Program.

The overarching evaluation question to be addressed is:

“to determine the extent to which SpO2 had a measurable impact on the mitigation of the conflict in the Casamance region”²

The Scope of Work then places this enquiry under a broader question: “What is the relationship between development programs and resolving/preventing conflict?”

The assignment is to generate knowledge on the links between development and conflict. It will specifically assist the USAID Mission in Senegal in refining its strategy and helping to develop future assessment methodologies.

USAID/Senegal Casamance Special Objective (SpO2) program spent US\$13.2 million over the period 1999-2005, and covered a wide range of activities from peace & reconciliation projects to more traditional development projects. Most of this funding was allocated under the 2000-2004 strategy, while the rest of it came in bits and pieces at various points during and after that period. The sectors of activity were, among others, health, education and building livelihoods.

In 2000, the WARP regional program created the SpO7 to complement the Senegal program and have a positive influence on the Casamance conflict. There are two programs in the Gambia and Guinea Bissau funded by WARP, which is based out of Ghana, with an allocation of US\$1,128 million in total. These activities address cross-border issues associated with the conflict and focus on improving the lives of refugees and their host communities, improving cross-border communication and interaction between villagers.

The aim of this evaluation is to identify the links between conflict dynamics and these multi-sector activities, whether locally or nationally, and hence identify the relationship (or lack thereof) between the SpO2 and SpO7 activities and conflict resolution.

The evaluation team has been asked in the SoW to examine the SpO programs’ degree of relevance to resolving the conflict, efficiency vis-à-vis the approach taken, impact on beneficiaries, and sustainability of results from the activities implemented between December 1999 and December 2005.

¹ Unless otherwise stated SpO program include both SpO2 and SpO7.

² Paragraph 1, Scope of Work.

2. Methodology

2.1 Concepts and glossary

There are certain agreed terms and concepts of development aid which the evaluation team considers relevant to the present exercise:

- **Objectives:** the intended results, stated in program documents (i.e. for which there is material evidence), as evidenced by verifiable changed conditions in the population.
- **Coherence:** the absence of contradiction between objectives in different fields
- **Coordination:** balanced and efficient interaction with outside agencies
- **Relevance:** the optimal alignment of objectives to the needs of the population.
- **Effectiveness:** the ability to match objectives with results achieved (either outputs or outcomes).
- **Efficiency:** the ability to achieve maximum results with given resources.
- **Results:** changes achieved through activities, outputs, outcomes or impact.
- **Outputs:** the deliverables provided by an agency (goods or services), usually measurable in quantitative terms.
- **Outcomes:** the use made by the beneficiaries of the outputs, as can be reasonably influenced by the agency (within its sphere of influence).
- **Impact:** the changes which result in the condition of the population from a series of outcomes.
- **Sustainability:** the continuation of the outcomes after implementation has been completed.
- **Peace:** this is considered as a process underpinned by a series of implemented agreements, for which implementation takes place at the strategic level as well as at the local population level. The main indicator by which progress is verified is a reduction in alienation or tension which could lead to violence, i.e. shifts in language and attitudes or behaviors of hostility in all their forms.

2.2 Analytical Tools

The basic point of reference to measure a program is its objectives. However here, as in most peace-building programs, the objectives and strategy are stated in general terms, and reality changes substantially over the period of implementation. This tests the flexible nature of aid programming and poses a challenge for end-of-operation assessments.

One routinely finds in conflict related programs that the link between both overall and intermediary results, and between those and the conflict dynamics, is a distant one, and attribution of causality (e.g. 'activity x leads to outcome y') is hard to define.

To overcome this distance Channel Research has used a two pronged method of evaluation based on an approach it is developing for conflict prevention evaluation:

- Conflict mapping: workshops based on expert judgment capture were held in two locations (Dakar and Ziguinchor). These workshops aim at identifying jointly events and trends that define the dynamics of the conflict. The workshops also begin responding to the question of which of these trends and events were affected by the program. Pictures of the results of these workshops are provided in a CD along with the printed report.
- Outcome definition and linkages: field work and interviews of staff allowed the team to elucidate program impact by defining the quality of the outcomes achieved in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. These are then linked back to conflict dynamics by assessing the relevance, duration and the extent of the impact.

The convergent use of these two methods is the identification of a plausible link between the programs and the conflict. In other words, verifiable connections between strategically important events/trends and program outcomes are made, while the developmental quality of results is also appreciated.

The evaluation is hence able to ask the following questions:

- Were the activities funded relevant (were there many strong links?) to the conflict related needs of the population in terms of less violence and more stability?
- How deeply did the program go to addressing these needs, in terms of extent and duration of influence brought to bear?
- In the context of traditional development, were programs efficient (what evidence is there of waste or savings in establishing these links?)
- Finally, was the program effective? (Were intended developmental results the same as those achieved?)

The assessment of the impact of the program on conflict is defined by posing the following questions concerning the linkages between the key events and trends and the outcomes and impact:

1. **R: Relevance:** how precisely did the influence of the program relate to the key drivers of the conflict as defined by people with expertise on the situation? Were the significant impacts delivered in a timely manner?
2. **D: Duration:** was the impact temporary and how long will it probably last? This is a time-based assessment which will be defined by looking at all the results, and estimating their longevity.
3. **E: Extent:** what was the depth and breadth of impact? This will most probably be defined in population terms, for example by detecting the numbers of direct beneficiaries (persons trained), the outcome beneficiaries (persons using the training), and the beneficiaries impacted (number of people affected by a dispute). This may also be measured by estimating the economic scale of the results achieved.

Other questions could also have been asked, such as frequency (how often did an impact occur over a fixed period of time?). We have in the present study limited ourselves to three criteria of

impact (duration and extent) to make it more viable for what is a pilot application of a new methodology applied in a short space of time.

It should be noted here that the method used is a combination of contextual appreciation and tracking of program outcomes. It seeks to avoid the more subjective elements of narrative explanations of the conflict, or the error-prone aggregation of figures presented in a balance score card fashion (see annex on evaluation methodologies). However we still run into the difficulty of obtaining inputs from a wide range of expertise: only two workshops were conducted to map the conflicts, one with Dakar based groups, and one with Zinguinchor based groups.

Moreover the quality of reporting at the level of components is very varied, and still dominated by outputs. These are more easily verifiable, and it is this level that aid agencies are most comfortable analyzing in the field. Were data on outcomes was missing, we were obliged to extrapolate from brief visits in the villages, interviews with informed stakeholders (for example ICRC, or political activists). These are necessarily limited.

The significance of impact variable we attribute is consequently a subjective judgment based on a professional appreciation of the data gathered by the evaluation team. It is organized in a systematic manner, and so we hope to have made it open to analytical debate.

We have used here a three tier system of high (3), medium (2), and low (1). This could have been a four tier system which forces a judgment on whether impact is above or below 'average', but we did not feel we had the necessary quality of data to make such a fine judgment in this study. This could for example be obtained in a more extensive exercise combining a quantitative opinion survey, and focus group discussions.

The assessment of the significance of impact is calculated with the following equation:

$$\text{Significance} = R \times D \times E$$

This rating of significance will provide the basis for an estimation of the impact of the program. By relating the impacts back to the programming process, it will also give an estimation of overall quality.

Individual projects which make up the Casamance Program have not been rated. Effectiveness was measured and rated in relation to specific components as they are described in project documents and interviews, e.g. economic reconstruction, negotiation and capacity building. The rating of, for example, reconstruction activities is based on an estimate of the impact of all reconstruction projects examined (across Implementing Partners).

2.3 Information Collection

Stages of collection

The evaluation has been carried out in two stages, even though this was not the original intention. A first mission was undertaken in by Mr. Christian Bugnion (a freelance consultant) and Mr. James Derleth (a USAID Washington employee) in August 2005, which produced a report mainly focused on conflict analysis and program design.

Subsequently a second mission was carried out in February 2006 to focus on the outcomes achieved and track the links from these outcomes back to the conflict. The evaluation team used the same evaluation methods for WARP and Senegal mission funded programs.

On March 11 2006 the report was sent to USAID Senegal and Ghana for review. Comments and suggestions were received on May 3. When these were about clarification, facts and syntax changes were made. When comments concerned evaluative judgment, and where the evaluation team disagreed, these disagreements have been reflected in footnotes to the text. The final report was presented to USAID on June 1 2006.

Strategic level information:

The evaluation team carried out two mapping exercises which brought together persons with varied backgrounds and knowledge of the conflict. One was held at the USAID Mission in Dakar, the other in a local administration meeting room in Ziguinchor.

The mapping exercise is a workshop technique which involves using a wall where cards are placed to denote events/trends, creating a very visual end product. The approach is highly participatory. Through the elicitation of unprepared opinions and knowledge, it was up to the participants to identify key events and trends which have affected the levels of violence and hostility, and the interaction between these key trends/events in the Casamance conflict. The participants in a first step identify some conflict events and trends, which are then connected by a series of arrows. This leads to the identification of new events and trends, constituting a sort of flow chart.

The important drivers of the conflict are then defined as the “nodes” in the mapping, i.e., points (events, trends) where many arrows converge. In other words: those events and trends which are heavily linked to many other events and trends. Some of these are amenable to influence from an aid program, in particular the more structural ones, which are less amenable to diplomatic influence, but may still be related to diplomatic influence. In the present evaluation we did not seek to define these more amenable drivers of the conflict, and focused only on those that the program did influence in our subsequent analysis.

Using this technique for an end-of-program evaluation, we assume that the identified ‘nodes’ represent issues that the program addressed, or should have addressed. The numbers of links pointing to a node indicates the intensity of the issue, which can be used as a proxy to identify priority interventions.

The mapping approach can also serve as a forward warning system, as it can be carried past the present to give some degree of forward looking prediction. It is above all a means to regularly

scan the conflict horizon and get updates on conflict dynamics, although this has not been the purpose here.

The nodes and drivers of the peace and conflict dynamics that were identified in the mapping exercises were checked independently by the team in the course of interviews with other stakeholders who had a good grasp of the situation. It was ascertained that no other salient points had been mentioned which had somehow been missed in the mapping.

Constraints and assumptions concerning the strategic level

This workshop technique is not as complicated as it may sound. It is the experience of the evaluation team that participants quickly grasp the methodology. It is however important to devote some time in the beginning of a session to explain the methodology and the purpose of the exercise properly. The technique cannot be used if participants cannot read or if participants are not familiar with more abstract thinking. The methodology could with advantage be adapted in order to be used in sessions with beneficiaries in the villages.

The mapping exercise is dynamic as it describes the development of a conflict situation. However once the model is drawn up its validity is bound by the continuation of overall conditions, and a qualitative change in the conflict would require a new model to be elaborated.

The process can be constrained, by the difficulty of getting stakeholders of very different viewpoints in one room. In this context it is difficult to get officials and rebels groups to participate in the same workshop.

The model would have to be used in an evaluation which makes allowance for workshops, and accepts a certain dependence on the validity of the judgement of those who attend. Another drawback is that it does not include the analysis of intent of key groups.

However it is the viewpoint of the evaluation team from both previous experience with this technique and from the workshops carried out in this context that one can to some extent assume that the participants step out of their normal functions. Once a workshop has started it becomes a group exercise and most participants are interested in identifying the conflict dynamic as accurately as possible. It is therefore of less importance that all stakeholders groups are represented. That said it is of course best to have as many groups as possible present. For the sessions carried out in this context we had an equal representation of both men and women from Casamance, local and international NGOs, USAID staff and other donors participating.

Management and field level information:

This aspect centered on planning, strategizing, activity design, and on monitoring of activities by SpO management. The efficiency of the SpO management was examined in the allocation of funding, the selection of partners and its monitoring and evaluation systems.

Semi-structured interviews with beneficiaries, other agencies active in the region, SpO management and Implementing Partners (IP) were carried out. The interviews were structured

by a questionnaire with some key open questions for discussion (see below). The list of persons met is included in annex.

On the local level we examined whether the activity outcomes matched the objectives set out in project documents and in the WARP and Senegal conflict strategies. This is akin to asking the question of whether the program was effective from a developmental or technical point of view, and if not, why not

USAID programs were implemented by a range of very different partners, ranging from UN-agencies, international NGOs, local NGOs, to private companies. The evaluation team therefore placed emphasis on visiting at least one project site and their beneficiaries per implementing partner (for both Senegal and WARP activities.)

Assumptions about sampling and data collection:

The SpO program has activities in very different sectors ranging from strictly peace and reconciliation projects to economic reconstruction, education and health program. The evaluation team visited all the different sectors. Since the evaluation sought to determine the impact of economic, social, and political activities on peace building it was important to include both economic and social development projects in the sample.

In the sampling of projects primary attention was paid to geographic distribution. Both Ziguinchor and Kolda were targeted, as well as Guinea Bissau and Gambia. However the projects were selected so that it was feasible for the evaluation team to carry out the necessary number of visits. Secondly, the sampling also included a cross section of partners and particularly sectors of activity.

The evaluation team did not include non-intervention villages/towns/city neighborhoods as a comparison group. We believe it is very difficult to sample a reliable control group after an intervention has taken place, and the evaluation team does not believe that it would bring a significant contribution to the analysis considering all the uncertain factors.

The evaluation team avoided revisiting the same project sites that have recently been visited by the first evaluation team, for which we used some of the information provided after the first visit. The previous evaluation team has listed the following projects as visited:

- The Gambia : Gifanga, Massara, Janack
- Guinea Bissau : Tambaca Novo, Bufo
- Casamance : Mpack, Mandina Mancagne, Cabrousse, Camaracounda, Singuer, Sindian, Tendine, Boyeme, Toucara, Diocadou, Petit Balandine, Biti-Biti, Bignona. Cashew processing unit in Boutoute.

A representative sample of projects under the WARP program was selected using the same sampling criteria. Time was set aside for a day trip to Guinea Bissau and a two day trip to Gambia.

In conclusion the sampling of projects was carried out on the basis of partners, sectors and geographic location, time and travel constraints in the region. The schedule of the evaluation was as follows:

15-30 January	Desk Study
30 January	Arrival of international evaluation team in Dakar
31 January to 3 February	Meetings and workshop in Dakar
4 February	Team flies to Ziguinchor
5 February	Meetings with IP and workshop in Ziguinchor
6-15 February	Project site visits in the region including Guinea Bissau and Gambia
15-16 February	Final interviews with USAID-Senegal Mission and debriefing

2.4 Assessment Method

The most challenging step in the evaluation is to measure how the outcome of a project, for example “improved standards of living”, can have an impact on attitudes, perceptions or behavior of individuals, families or communities. We primarily evaluated this by testing the significance of the program in terms of the degree of relevance and effectiveness.

The overall effectiveness or success of the Casamance program was hence not linked to the peace process as such (which could be variously seen as the signature of a peace agreement document, or the current “no peace no war” situation). Many other factors intervene, which make attribution of impact more problematic.

Reconciliation and a successful peace process (in the wider sense of pre-negotiation, peace accord, prevailing of favorable attitudes and confidence, and preparation for a broad-based treaty implementation) were the ultimate goals of the Casamance program, but the evaluation is not in a position to assess whether this has been reached. What has been assessed was the strength of the contribution to reaching that goal which is beyond the manageable interests of USAID.

The approach used by the team was not to evaluate simply in terms of reaching stated objectives (by looking at specific indicators.) We decided instead to start from a complex analysis of the conflict, and subsequently selected to focus on those events and trends which have accelerated peace and limited the expansion of the conflict. We then assessed the significance of the links binding these events and trends to program outcomes.

3. Background

3.1 Geography, Actors and Conflict

Since 1982, the southern region of Senegal (Casamance) has been the scene of a protracted conflict between the Senegalese government and a group fighting for an independent Casamance, the *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance* (MFDC). Now in its twenty-fourth year (2006), it is one of West Africa's longest-running civil conflicts. This endemic conflict has limited the development of both the Casamance--once considered the country's breadbasket--and Senegal overall. The conflict has also affected neighboring Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, fostering internal and regional instability. Paradoxically the conflict is relatively contained, and is seen in international circles as amenable to diplomatic negotiation facilitation.

The Casamance region is located in the southwest corner of Senegal, sandwiched between Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. It is divided into two administrative regions named for their respective capitals; Ziguinchor in the west and Kolda in the east. The geographic separation of the Casamance from northern Senegal is increased by geographic and demographic differences. The Casamance, for example, has a wet tropical climate in contrast to greater Senegal's predominantly semi-arid conditions. Bisected by the Casamance River, this region has lush forests and orchards of cashews, mangoes, citrus fruits and oil palms. Other major crops include rice, other cereals and groundnuts.



Demographically, the population of the Casamance is approximately 1.5 million. One third of total (438,000), live in Ziguinchor. According to the last official census (1988), over 57% of the population is younger than 20 years old. The region is ethnically diverse, although the Diola comprise over 65% of the population. The Wolof, which nationally comprise a majority of the

population (43%) and dominate the economic and political structures, comprise less than 5% of the population in the Casamance region. There is a strong regional identity among the Casamançais, particularly the Diola, in which they distinguish themselves from *nordistes* (northern Senegalese). The Casamance Diola have longstanding family and economic links with Diola in Guinea-Bissau and Gambia.

Historically, the Casamance underwent a different colonial experience than the rest of Senegal. The French authorities acquired it later in their colonization of the rest of the country and did so by trading territory with the Portuguese.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, protests against Dakar's administration of the Casamance led to the renewed formation of the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de la Casamance* (MFDC). Named after a late-colonial era political party, the MFDC has actively sought independence for the Casamance since 1982, citing its separate colonial history, cultural differences with the rest of Senegal, and assertions of unfair governance and economic discrimination from country leaders in Dakar.

The formal outbreak of the conflict came one December 26, 1982, when demonstrators – estimates range from a few hundred to a few thousand – marched in Ziguinchor, replacing the Senegalese tricolor flag on public buildings with the white flag of the Casamance. Small-scale, but violent clashes with the *gendarmerie* left a number of people injured, including a *gendarme* who subsequently died. The ensuing government crackdown drove the rebellion underground, away from political protest and towards armed violence, culminating in the creation of the armed wing of the MFDC, the *maquis* (guerrilla group).

The *maquis* retreated to the region's forests and across the border to Guinea-Bissau, where they acquired arms and underwent military training. In April 1990, the *maquis* conducted its first operation, attacking the customs post at Séléti on the Gambian border. This marked the start of the 'military phase' of the conflict. The appointment of a military governor to Ziguinchor region in May 1990 and a large-scale army deployment fostered a spiral of violence and human rights abuses by both sides.

Throughout the 1990s, a combination of military, political and diplomatic efforts failed to resolve the conflict. Ceasefires and accords were signed between the MFDC and the Government of Senegal (GoS), but sporadic violence continued. By the mid-1990s, the civilian population of large areas along the Guinea-Bissau border had been displaced from their homes. In August 1997, elements of the *maquis* began planting anti-personnel mines along the border zone with Guinea-Bissau, effectively preventing both refugees and people who remained in the area from using their fields, a problem which continues today.

The MFDC

Organizationally, while the MFDC is nominally led by its secretary-general (Father Diamacoune Senghor, a Catholic priest), it is in practice divided into numerous factions. Consequently, it has an ill-defined organizational structure, with significant infighting among various factions. The

principal divisions are between its political and military wings, between factions within the military wing, and between factions within the political wing. This situation has hindered attempts at peace.

The split between the political and military factions of the MFDC is rooted in the origins of the group. While the *maquis* was being organized in the 1980s, the leaders of the political wing were in prison, only entering into negotiations with the Government of Senegal after they were released in 1991. After that point, the political wing could claim that its commitments were made on behalf of the MFDC, but there has been little or no consultation with the *maquisards*. As a result, there was no means to ensure their compliance, and harmonizing positions between--and within--the political and military wings was and remains difficult.

The *maquis* itself underwent a series of splits in the 1990s. The two main factions are the *Front Nord* (Northern Front) and the *Front Sud* (Southern Front), named for their original areas of operation within the Casamance. There are also subdivisions within these groups, with the dynamics within and between these sub-groups remaining fluid. In all, government intelligence sources consulted by the evaluation mission estimate the total number of *maquisards* to be 2,516.

In terms of resources, the *Front Sud* obtains funds from taxes on local farmers and refugees, armed robberies, and cattle-rustling. Stolen Casamance cattle and cars are then sold or traded in Guinea-Bissau. Additionally, most researchers believe a crucial source of livelihoods for the *maquisards* is their family and ethnic connections in the Casamance and neighboring countries. The resulting mutual support networks benefit the *maquis*, supporters who did not leave the Casamance, and refugees who did. However, it should be noted that a number of groups besides the *maquis* from within the Casamance and/or neighboring states carry out similar acts of economic violence. Such groups, which include professional or opportunistic bandits, former *maquisards* and Guinea-Bissau soldiers, have made it difficult to distinguish between *maquis* violence and general banditry, although both add to the population's sense of insecurity.

The Casamance conflict cannot be understood in isolation from the rest of the region. From an early stage, Guinea-Bissau has been home to *Front Sud* rear bases, while active or retired Guinea-Bissau soldiers have supported and/or taken part in *maquis* operations in the Casamance. Along the northern border of the Casamance, Gambia is believed to harbor and supply elements of the MFDC, especially since President Jammeh seized power in 1994. However, Jammeh plays a key role as both a broker between the Senegalese government and the MFDC and has hosted meetings with the latter group.

The Cost of the Conflict

While relatively small compared with other conflicts in West Africa, the humanitarian impact of the conflict is still considerable. Between 3,000 – 5,000 people have died, with at least 652 killed or wounded by landmines and unexploded ordnance. Many more have been displaced: a 1998 Caritas census estimated a total of 62,638 internally displaced persons (IDPs), with the largest number (approximately 14,000) in or around Ziguinchor. In terms of refugees, the Gambian Red Cross estimates that there were approximately 6,000 Senegalese refugees in Gambia, while the

Guinea-Bissau National Refugee Agency asserted that approximately 6,000 more were residing in their country in 2003.

At the local level, over 240 villages have been abandoned. Approximately 1000-1500 hectares of arable land are mined or suspected of being mined and are thus not used. Social services (schools and medical services) have stopped functioning in many remote areas, especially along the borders.

Throughout the 1990s, a combination of military, political and diplomatic efforts failed to resolve the conflict. Ceasefires and accords were signed between the MFDC and the Government of Senegal, but there is still no comprehensive peace treaty.

Between 2002 and 2004, Senegalese President Wade conducted piecemeal negotiations with various military and political factions of the MFDC. He appointed the head of the Gendarmerie, General Fall, to manage the Casamance negotiations, with an ex-rebel as his intermediary/emissary. The government and the World Bank have completed a comprehensive development plan for the Casamance peace process which includes demining, demobilization, infrastructure rehabilitation, and local development elements; however, it has yet to be implemented.

Despite an amnesty law and a December 2004 cease-fire signed by the political wing of the MFDC and Government of Senegal, occasional violent incidents continue to take place. In July 2005, a public bus was stopped by the MFDC in the *Front Nord* zone. Two Senegalese police officers were taken from the bus and executed. Day to day the situation is best described as chronic, low-grade insecurity, with the principal risks being armed robbery and in certain areas, landmines. However a series of MFDC related incidents over the last 3-4 months has increased insecurity on the ground. Civilians have been killed or injured by the MFDC, the Sous Préfet of Diouloulou was assassinated, and there has been infighting between MFDC camps (an internal take over of Northern Front hard line camps).

All these incidents serve as a reminder that the conflict is not over. However the incidents remain isolated and no single incident has provoked a backlash in terms of serious fighting between the MFDC and the Senegalese military or between MFDC factions.

3.2 Gambia and Guinea Bissau

The evaluation team could not carry out workshops in Guinea Bissau and Gambia because of time constraints. Therefore the conflict analysis of the situation in the border regions of Gambia and Guinea Bissau is based exclusively on qualitative interviews with the population in the border areas and implementing partners and reports from implementing partners or other sources such as UNHCR.

Population movements are fluid in the border areas of Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Casamance. The UNHCR estimates there were approximately 548 Senegalese refugees registered in Gambia

in 2004, and 7317 Senegalese refugees in Guinea Bissau in 2003³. However the number of unregistered refugees in the Guinea-Bissau is generally estimated to be higher⁴, with the added complexity of kinship ties across the border and successive crossings by families. There is clearly no exact overview of the number of remaining refugees in Gambia and Guinea Bissau. Even among the aid agencies the estimate of Senegalese refugees in 2004 in Gambia vary from 548 (UNHCR) to 1927 (Concern Universal) or 3824 (Gambia Red Cross)⁵.

Conditions of life are virtually the same on both sides of the borders. Refugees and IDPs have placed an additional burden on host communities where resources are already limited. Animals brought over the border by refugees have destroyed vegetable gardens. There has been an overuse of water sources and pressure on services such as health and education. Other spill-over effects include armed robbery, cattle-rustling, unsustainable timber extraction and drug and small arms trafficking.

These negative effects have caused some resentment and discrimination in hosting communities against refugees, and there has even been talk of forced return⁶.

A cause for tension is the issue of land. This issue was raised most repeatedly by the host population in Guinea Bissau and Gambia in interviews with the evaluation team. Refugees have borrowed land from the host communities and are unable or unwilling to return the land as they have decided to settle down especially in Guinea Bissau.

Some of the remaining Senegalese refugees, whom the evaluation team spoke to, do not believe it is safe to return. Some of them are people who had taken “sides” and are thus much less willing to return, since they believe their personal safety is at risk. The evaluation team has witnessed many villages in Casamance with a strong military presence and the population in the villages in Casamance has confirmed that former inhabitants are reluctant to return because they are afraid of the Senegalese military.

Other refugees explained to the evaluation team that they do not intend to return home because they have married and settled down. One of the features of the Casamance conflict is that many of the Casamance population have extended family and relatives living either in Gambia or in Guinea-Bissau.

Another reason cited is the lack of economic opportunities. Since there are limited livelihood opportunities in the depressed socio-economic area of the Casamance, numerous IDPs and refugees have left the area. For example, in Mpack village, more than 300 youths moved to other parts of the country or the Gambia or Guinea-Bissau to find jobs.

³ There are no registered Senegalese refugees in Guinea-Bissau in 2004 according to UNHCR

⁴ See RFA for Guinea Bissau 2002

⁵ The figures from CU and Gambian Red Cross is for the Western Division only

⁶ See RFA for Guinea Bissau 2002, Concern Midterm Evaluation July 2005

Some interviewees in the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau framed their decision to return by stating that “we all had the same reason for leaving collectively but we each have individual reasons for returning.”

The border presents a unique element to contain the conflict, and also to act as a sanctuary from which violence and theft are perpetrated (from both sides). On one hand, the illegal sale of agricultural products and narcotics, the prevalence of small arms, the stifling of legitimate trade through abusive border taxation, are drivers of conflict relevant to WARP programming. On the other hand, the protection afforded to refugees under international law and the support of local host populations have mitigated the effects of the war, and these factors need to be considered when framing peace-building in the region.

3.3 Evaluation Mapping Results

As described in the methodology section the evaluation team has used a combination of conflict mapping workshops (see detailed results in annex 3) and qualitative interviews with implementing partners and the population in the region, to identify the key events and trends of conflict and peace dynamic in the Casamance conflict.

The cultural and physical isolation of Casamance has been identified by all stakeholders as one of the main original drivers of conflict. The isolation originates from the fact that Casamance is physically isolated from the rest of Senegal, and the fact that there is limited infrastructure to link the two together. Moreover Casamance is dominated by an ethnic group (the Diolas) that is Christian and has strong ties to the population in Gambia and Guinea Bissau, which brought to the fore issues of conflictual identity.

Expropriation of land by the Government of Senegal is another original driver of conflict back in the in the 60s. The state would expropriate the land and sell it to Northerners (people not originating from Casamance). A key event that symbolized that trend came with the establishment of a Club Med in 1973 on land that had been expropriated from local people.

Landownership conflicts continue today. Conflicts, between population groups over land right and use, have been aggravated by the conflict itself especially by population movements-people would borrow and use land not originally belonging to them.

Increased military presence and activity along with recruitment by MFDC in the population in the 1990s have been identified as important conflict drivers. Other key issues identified have been fragmentation of rebel fronts, appearance of mines and an increase in assaults on civilians. Lastly the appearance of a war economy has been identified as an obstacle to the creation of peace.

The fact that the population became increasingly “fed up” (‘fatiguée’) with the conflict, has, according to stakeholders, led to an improvement of peace efforts on both local and political

level. The fact that the population is more resistant to calls for violence has also led to decreasing support for MFDC both financially and morally.

Interestingly, the fact that the donors left in the end of the 90s has not been identified as a key event. Population displacements in the same period have not been identified as an important event either. However the return of the donors along with the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure has been a key event that has contributed to a mass return of the displaced persons. The return is identified as *the* key event in creating peace. The return has acted as a symbol of peace that has encouraged even more people to return. This dual link, identified in the mapping, highlights the importance of aid programs in the conflict. Lastly strengthening of civil society (and of the status of women) has been identified as an important driver of peace in the region.

Another interesting finding shows that the peace agreements signed thus far appear to have increased criminality and fragmentation of chain of command within the MFDC. The creation of ANRAC appears to be of little consequence to the population. Peace talks are not centralized, and many channels of communication are open between different parties, thereby, reducing the overall level of transparency for the stakeholders outside of the circle of decision makers.

The laying of mines has been identified as a key event, whereas mine accidents in themselves do not have any links to the conflict dynamic. It would seem that the mines contribute to a diffuse sense of crisis and to a loss of livelihoods, creating a “state of exception” where violence is justified. In this context the return of refugees is less probable, and entire plantations escape from the control of their owners, while they seem to be accessed by other groups who presumably know the locations of the mines.

Further details of the conflict mapping findings are provided in annex 5. Slides are included separately to this report in a CD Rom.

3.4 In Summary

The conflict in the Casamance has lasted more than 20 years and the conflict dynamic has changed. The key drivers have developed from artificial political and cultural borders, physical isolation of the region, a perception of threatened geographical and religious identities, conflicts on land tenure and use, perceived lack of investment by the Government of Senegal in the region. As the conflict escalated other conflict drivers emerged such as increasing economic impoverishment, the prevalence of small arms and anti-personnel mines and the fragmentation of chains of command among rebel groups. The drivers of peace have been the exhaustion of the population, repatriation and the reconstruction of villages and basic community infrastructure, and the development of civil society.

4. Description of the Intervention

4.1 Aims of USAID

Preparatory USAID strategy documents indicate that a diversified economic base and a healthier, better educated population are keys to achieving and sustaining growth for Casamance. USAID intends to continue to work towards securing a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the Casamance. A peaceful Casamance can not only significantly reduce the risks for backsliding in Senegal and the region, but also provide an economic catalyst that can attract, rather than discourage, investment in Senegal.

Partnership with the Senegalese government to become a modern, prosperous, democratic state with a majority Muslim population is an important US foreign policy priority. It is noted that failing to achieve this goal would have grave regional repercussions.

4.2 Strategy of Intervention

USAID has a long history of involvement in Senegal. Established in 1964, USAID/Senegal is one of USAID's oldest missions. In 1997, security concerns forced USAID to end many of its regular programming activities in the Casamance. However in 1999 USAID/Senegal created the Casamance Recovery Program Strategy (CRPS) which outlined the strategy behind the SpO2 program that is the object of investigation in this evaluation.

There is no single policy document that formally outlines the thinking behind the strategy of the SpO2 program. There is however a range of documents that indicates the rationale behind the strategy, among others the Country Strategic Plan 1998-2006, and the SpO concept paper.

More importantly our interviews provided information on the role of the US Embassy from 1999 in entering the peace process and seeking to encourage a resolution. This effort was led in particular (starting in 2003) by US Ambassador Roth. Under his guidance, a few assistance efforts were made as a way of encouraging conflicting groups to negotiate, and demonstrate in a material manner (for example, the reconstruction of Mpack village) the benefits of a return to normality.

The evaluation team was provided with some of the documents used in the preparation of the Country Strategic Plan (CSP) 1998-2006⁷. In these documents different possible solutions to resolve the conflict were suggested such as de-centralization, ethnic reconciliation, resolution of land-tenure issues, and reduced economic isolation through infrastructure development, but without further analysis and investigation.

USAID/Senegal did not move forward with a Casamance Specific Objective program in its CSP for 1998-2006. It was believed that the instability did not allow for the implementation of normal program activities, and most importantly, it was stressed in the CSP that the upsurge of

⁷ See Denoeuz 1997, Gellar 1997

violence in Casamance was an internal civil matter for which the Government of Senegal did not express any need for or acceptance of assistance.

However less than a year after the approval of the USAID/Senegal CSP 1998-2006, two related events intervened to dramatically change the USAID strategy vis-à-vis the Casamance. First, the political situation on the ground seemed to evolve considerably as Senegal's then President Abdou Diouf met for the first time in a face to face encounter with rebel leader Abbe Augustin Diamacoune Senghor of the MFDC in January of 1999. Secondly this meeting led to a joint appeal on the part of Diouf and Diamacoune for an end to hostilities and pursuit of a peaceful settlement.

In the wake of this declaration in April 1999 the Prime Minister of Senegal launched an urgent appeal to donors for funds to support peace and reconstruction in Casamance. It was in direct response to this appeal that the US Government changed their position and approved the Casamance Recovery Program Strategy (CRPS) in August 1999 and thereby the SpO2 program.

The objective of the Casamance program was to create: **“Improved enabling conditions for peace via economic, social, and political development in support of the peace process”** with key intermediate results:

- Improved standards of living for Affected Populations
- Increased Self-Reliance for Local Development Actors
- Improved Conditions for Local Level Conflict Resolution

The main argument was that “among the principal complaints of the people of the Casamance is the assertion that not enough development resources are provided to the Casamance and that they do not have enough say over the use of the resources that are provided”⁸. Following from this conclusion, it is stated that it is important to empower grass-roots organizations in the programming of funds, so that the people of the Casamance are genuinely the “owners” of activities receiving funding under this SpO.

It is furthermore stated that “the implementation of this SPO, in close collaboration with regular program assistance, will help create conditions favorable to ensure the will needed to resolve what is essentially a political problem”.

Political constraints

The most important constraint to the Casamance program in the original design phase was that although the Government of Senegal asked donors to help rebuild the Casamance, the conflict itself was still considered an internal civil matter by the Government of Senegal.

Until 2003, President Wade would only allow very neutral development projects. The Mission saw this constraint as the most important reason for deciding to try to create enabling

⁸ See SpO concept paper 1999

conditions for a peaceful environment that targeted improved living conditions, building local capacity to manage development, and grassroots conflict resolution.

Consequently no overt support of high level political negotiations was included in the programming activities or results framework. Such political actions were not deemed possible and were never targeted by the Dakar USAID mission staff to be a part of the activity at that stage, and even less so, issues such as land registration, or the trade in small arms where USAID faces legal restrictions.

Budget constraints

Although \$10 million is a substantial amount over the 5 year programming period there are still limits to the type of activities that could be chosen. Large infrastructure projects were for example not possible within the \$ 10 million budget, regardless of the need. At the same time the range of activities proved to be a constraint within this budget, as it was not possible for USAID to maintain a complete overview of all the aspects of the projects carried out by the Implementing Partners.

4.3 Priority Setting

Given the political constraints cited above and the security conditions in the region an in-depth conflict analysis was not carried out. Furthermore, Agency level conflict-specific strategic guidance was almost non-existent in 1999 when the program was designed.

The Mission did carry out a number of analyses in preparation for the strategy design. Information was gathered from the available sources and key stakeholders both in Ziguinchor and Dakar. The written analysis of this information can be found in the Casamance concept paper. The perception of the Mission from these targeted discussions with Government of Senegal, MFDC, and Casamance Civil Society Organizations, was that improved living conditions/economic development was required to further peace.

USAID reviewed its development-conflict assumptions, but did not seek to define more precise causes of the conflict than those stated by key respondents: a lack of economic development, physical isolation, political disenfranchisement, cultural de-valorization, and a sense of historical injustice.

The conflict analysis that has been used to prepare the Country Strategic Plan (CSP) 1998-2006⁹ was part of the conflict mapping for the Casamance program. In this conflict analysis, drivers such as political and economic domination of Casamance by Northerners, isolation and lack of access to public works, and a general perception that a distinct cultural and religious identity (Catholic and Diola) were being systematically threatened in greater Senegal were described. Solutions such as decentralization, ethnic reconciliation, resolution of land-tenure issues, and reduced economic isolation (through infrastructure development) were suggested.

⁹ See Denoeuz 1997, Gellar 1997

4.4 In Summary

The USAID Mission in Dakar carried out an analysis of the development needs, and acquired an understanding of the conflict as it related to grassroots development programming, and on how to implement it in a conflict sensitive manner. The involvement of WARP was requested, although this program developed in a very separate manner later on. The architectural principles of the programs were the following:

1. To emphasize rapid execution and public visibility
2. To rely on experienced Implementing Partners to allocate high impact but small scale resources at the community level, while retaining good technical oversight
3. To intervene in a variety of sectors identified by the population and institutional stakeholders as important.

The idea of using traditional development activities to resolve or prevent conflict is implicit in the concept paper from 1999 that outlines the strategy behind the Casamance program; however, the assumption is not elaborated much further. The strategy of creating a “will” to solve the conflict and the idea of using traditional development activities with a peace building component is not thoroughly explained at the strategy design phase. It seems to lie in the accepted notion that highly visible “peace dividends” in a wide number of areas will create a strong current of support for peace talks.

5. Description of the Activities

5.1 Activities under SpO2

USAID/Senegal has financed program components in four key areas: economic well being, local capacity building, improved living conditions, and the prevention and mitigation of conflict.

USAID has used a two-pronged, multi-sector approach that addresses the conflict:

- Directly via activities such as conflict resolution at the grassroots level between villages, youth leadership training, traditional methods of peace building, and facilitation of high-level political meetings; and
- Indirectly via traditional development activities in microfinance, income generation, private sector, agriculture/NRM, infrastructure rehabilitation, and improved health/education services. ¹⁰

Activities	Implementing Partners	Expected Results	Contract amounts
Peace & reconciliation	APRAN	Peace Building	\$ 51,000

¹⁰ It is stressed that all indirect activities have had an explicit peace building component, except for one project targeting the private sector.

		activities, cultural weekends	
Infrastructure rehabilitation & microenterprise	APRAN	Community infrastructure rehabilitation (schools, health posts, wells); finance for income generating projects; projects focused on alleviating work burden of women	\$ 760,200
Alimentation & infrastructure rehabilitation for returnees	APRAN	Food aid to returnees; wells at reconstruction site	\$ 41,250
Multisector	CRS	Improved microfinance programs; sesame cultivation; peace building; housing & infrastructure rehabilitation	\$ 2,787,000
Peace building and infrastructure rehabilitation	CRS	Housing and community infrastructure rehabilitation & peace building activities at the local level.	\$ 1,260,000
Multisector	Africare	Water retentions projects; capacity building with village committees; training in water management, bee keeping, fish farming, fruit processing, and enterprise management	\$ 1,220,800
Private sector	Enterprise works	New technologies: mini forage, manual pumps & cashew processing; counterseason market gardening; technical and management training for entrepreneurs (cashews & market gardeners); improved palm trees;	\$ 798,100
Health	UNICEF	Vaccination programs, fight against malaria, land mine awareness,	\$ 372,750

		stress management, conflict resolution	
Health (landmines)	Handicap International	Prosthesis; reinforcement for the medical system to treat landmine victims/handicapped persons; projects focused on handicapped persons, landmine awareness campaign	\$ 565,900
Health (landmines)	Handicap International	Prosthesis; reinforcement for the medical system to treat landmine victims/handicapped persons; projects focused on handicapped persons, landmine awareness campaign	\$ 1,000,000
Youth Capacity building	World Education	Capacity building with youth associations	\$ 259,200
Peace & reconciliation	World Education	Mini-projects to support community projects, capacity building with local NGOs, peace building activities (cultural weekends)	\$ 1,688,100
Youth capacity building/income generation	ASACASE	Working with at-risk youth to decrease unemployment and idleness	\$ 560,700
Peace & reconciliation	PADCO	Capacity Building in negotiation and conflict resolution with Key Constituencies in the Casamance	\$ 700,000
Total Contract Amount			\$ 12,065,000

These Implementing Partners were in turn supported by a wide network of local groups and NGOs, which achieved the interface with the population. These groups were at the same time receiving other funds from other sources (such as the German Cooperation funded reconstruction program) and were engaged in a number of sectors. The contribution of the local NGOs was mostly in the form of local knowledge and field presence, including cultural sensitivity and quality control.

5.2 Activities under WARP

USAID created the West Africa Regional Program (WARP) in 2000. The rationale for the Program was that: “the region requires an entity that can address issues that are inherently regional in nature and that cannot be handled at a purely bilateral level.” Among the issues that do not respect national boundaries is regional conflict.

USAID/Senegal was limited to work in Senegal, not in the Gambia or Guinea-Bissau, which are directly impacted by the unrest and in turn had an influence on it. This gap in programming made it difficult to achieve peace and stability in the sub-region. Therefore the WARP programming was to complement USAID/Senegal’s Casamance Peace-building and Reconstruction Program.

WARP initiated its “Capacity-Building of Civil Society in Cross-Border Peace-Building (Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and Gambia)” program in 2002. The goal of this initiative was: “To promote sub-regional stability through increased cross-border and sub-regional participation of CSOs in conflict prevention and peace-building.”

WARP created a program to complement Senegal’s program and have a positive influence on the Casamance conflict. It had the following goal:

“Early detection and response mechanisms to prevent regional conflicts established and functioning.”

This overall goal was changed in 2004 to “creating enabling conditions to peace via economic, social and political development in support of the peace process,” which is the exact same wording as the goal of the SpO2 program.

There are two programs in the Gambia and Guinea Bissau funded by USAID/WARP that address cross-border issues associated with the conflict. These activities focus on improving the lives of refugees and their host communities, and improving cross-border communication and interaction between villagers.

Activities

Small grants for:

- Cross-border peace-building activities;
- Training in conflict analysis, early warning and response, community dialogue and reconciliation for local development organizations in Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal, with particular emphasis on the integration of peace-building and community development
- Networking and advocacy to promote greater collaboration among CSOs in Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia in regional peace-building efforts.

Partners

- Concern Universal (CU) - Gambia

- Adventist Development and Relief Association (ADRA) - Guinea Bissau

6. Assessment of Implementation

This section will analyze the management tools, the procurements rules, selection of partners and activities as well as the monitoring and evaluation system that was available to Casamance program management (both US/Senegal Mission and the WARP Mission).

6.1 Management Tools

USAID strategic planning and management policies and procedures evolved significantly over the time period under study for this evaluation. However they remained characterized by a high level of definition of the results and activities at the outset.

USAID was undergoing institutional changes at the same time that the Country Strategic Plan 1998-2006 and the special objective for the Casamance were taking shape. The most significant internal shifts were designed to move USAID toward a fully integrated strategic planning and results-based management approach to development programming.

The shift in management procedures from blueprint (input focused) to result based management gave management more flexibility on how to achieve results. In the Casamance program concept paper it was stressed that it was important to maintain a large degree of flexibility in order to respond in a timely manner to needs as they arose. It was thus anticipated that the overall strategic framework could be modified and adapted to better capture objectives and results as circumstances changed.

Results based management may not be the most appropriate guiding tool for management of a conflict program where circumstances and objectives can change suddenly, and clearly identified goals can pre-judge the content of the peace being sought.

However accountability demands from Congress requires USAID to limit flexible management tools for management of conflict programs. Issue based management, which could have been a flexible way of managing conflict and has been discussed in US government planning, could not be introduced. The approach we have chosen for the evaluation, which is to focus on those factors which lead a situation to change in certain directions, seems not to have been considered.

The Results Framework

Consequently the Casamance program management team was guided by a Result Framework. The Results Framework was changed in May 2000 after less than a year. The change in wording

was significant but the basic objectives stayed the same. Since then the Results Framework has not been changed even though conflict dynamics have changed ¹¹.

Casamance program management did not revise the Results Framework when circumstances changed in the middle of the program period. It did not seek a revised Results Framework when political circumstances changed in Senegal around 2003, and more high level political conflict resolution was tolerated by the new President of Senegal. This evolution in context did not affect the delivery of the components to the program as they were implemented through different agencies. However new needs which emerged (as we shall see later) could not be covered.

A weakness with the Results Framework that guided the Casamance program was that it was very focused on the use of large international partners, due to the scale of grants. It did include an intermediate result of strengthening of civil society actors as a separate issue. The evaluation finds however that this capacity building objective was not fully achieved due to the implementation modality.

Capacity building was an important part of the program to create strong local ownership and control over development resources. This was identified at the design phase of the program strategy as an important factor that could contribute positively to peace building in the region.

However the Casamance Program did not take into account the reluctance of international NGOs to engage in a long range manner with local partners in programming. Limited capacity among local partners, a lack of long term knowledge regarding the funding intentions of USAID among international partners, and above all the practice of international NGOs of subcontracting tasks rather than partnering with local NGOs, all contributed to a very opportunistic attitude to resource mobilization among local partners. In spite of a capacity building philosophy in USAID, the outcome has been the creation of a relatively unsustainable group of local actors with limited understanding of the strategic aim of the program.

The Results Framework for the WARP program did undergo significant change. There was a shift in WARP's strategy, from an emphasis on ECOWAS and civil society as the focus of conflict prevention and mitigation efforts, to more direct intervention in the cross-border aspects, causes and consequences of conflict. Both the documentation and the interviews show that the substantial change of objectives was carried out in order to better match the reality of the projects that were carried out by WARP's partners. In other words, the presence of the partners in the areas, competences of the partners and their activities already in place determined the way the Result Framework was drawn up and not vice versa.

WARP SO7 from 2004 began direct field visits to ascertain the field realities as compared to what was presented in the Quarterly Reports. This led to sharing of the New Results Framework for the partners to respond to in the first instance. This also led to a partners meeting in Ziguinchor where ADRA and her partners were given a walk through the new

¹¹ An example of the framework is to be found in annex.

Framework. Consequently ADRA was requested to submit Work plans that would respond to the Results Framework. They did and this gave their projects a new lease of life. In November, 2005 Project Managers of the respective IPs were invited to a Conflict Sensitive M&E training by USAID Contractors. Again, WARP Program Office walked the Implementing partners through the results Frame Work after the conflict sensitive M&E training. Our Partners were again invited to WARP Mission to participate in SO7's Activity Review Record (ARPS) presentation to the new Mission Director. Thus 2005 and 2006 reports have addressed SO7 results Framework.

Coordination between Senegal and WARP

WARP's program is managed from Accra, Ghana, making project management more difficult, particularly as regards adjustments and monitoring. No formal mechanism for coordination between the two missions existed until 2004, and there was little coordination until the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed. The MoU became the focal point of joint coordination between the staff of USAID/Senegal and USAID/WARP on program M&E visits, spot checks and assessment visits.

6.2 Selection of Partners and Activities

Within the USAID rules and procedures there are several routes that can be taken in order to select implementing partners and activities. The Casamance team in 1999 decided to use an Annual Program Statement (APS.)¹² Interested applicants were asked to submit proposals for an activity which would accomplish all or part of the expected results. The APS is very broad and it does not suggest specific activities.

The logic behind choosing an APS was because it is the most flexible procurement instrument, as it allows flexible proposals and discussion between the bidder and USAID before finalizing the proposal. It also allows the most freedom on the part of the bidder to combine as few or as many of the components of the APS. The following contracts were signed through the APS in October 2000: Africare, EnterpriseWorks, World Education I, APRAN II, and Unicef II.

The following unsolicited proposals were received: CRS I, APRAN I&III, UNICEF II, Handicap I&II. Unsolicited proposals were received either before the APS was launched (CRS I and APRAN II) or as a result of an Embassy Commitment (APRAN III), as a proposal linked to an already existing program (UNICEF II) or as funding decision from Washington (Leahy War Victim Fund) in the case of Handicap I and II.

The Casamance program management used the Request For Application (RFA) instrument in a limited number of cases (World Education II, ASACASE, CRS II) With a RFA USAID can identify a specific sector such as reconstruction with a peace building component. This instrument can be used if USAID has a good understanding of activity implementation

¹² An APS explains the program background, the problem statement and lists all of the expected results which the special objective (or any strategic objective) team is seeking to accomplish with its strategy

parameters. An RFA allows the Mission to address gaps that emerge in the proposals it receives through the APS window.

Casamance program management also used the Requests for Proposal (RFP), which is meant for commercial organizations, on one occasion when awarding an Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) task order to a consultancy firm (PADCO). USAID retains much more operational guidance and management control of the activity in a contract than in a grant or cooperative agreement, but the downside is that the contracts are much less flexible in implementation and more work-intensive for the Mission.

For both the APS and the RFA, once an agreement is signed or a grant is given, USAID cannot require that implementation be done in a certain way versus another. USAID involvement in the activity is limited to approving the annual work plan, hiring of key personnel, approving reports, monitoring, and ensuring that the project appears to be on schedule in achieving its expected results by tracking indicators. In reality, if there is a good working relationship between USAID and the NGO, suggestions can be made about project implementation, if there appears to be a problem or if impact can be maximized.

However, as for most aid donors, USAID has limited powers to adapt and adjust the program as such after an agreement has been signed. A coordinated and coherent program therefore has to be ensured at the outset when selecting partners and activities. Proposals and subsequently agreements are detailed enough to give USAID a good indication of expected results. It is at this stage that USAID has to make sure that the partners and activities at least in theory are well matched, and that no important needs are ignored.

The use of local NGOs led to a certain blurring of the clear sectoral categories described in project documents. While for example an activity might be labeled conflict resolution (such as AJAEDO through World Education), the implementing organization is frequently also involved in reconstruction (for other donors) and livelihoods programs, for example through the support to village pirogues. The lines are difficult to draw, and the particular strength of the local NGOs (their wealth of local contacts and communities' trust) are subsumed under the prime partner's sectoral definition of work (reconstruction, awareness raising, etc...).

The modality chosen here, which is frequently found in large programs, is made all the more complex by the fact that the local organizations, as sub-grantees (with an apparently shorter timeline than the prime partners), operate within a very limited planning horizon: as funding is allocated to them in very small amounts by the prime implementing partners, they have to be very opportunistic and strategically broad (meaning that they cannot specialize) with all donors in what they can implement.

This modality is contrasted by that adopted for example by NGOs which are used to operating through a single local partner, such as the Red Cross Movement or the church networks. In these cases the planning is done jointly, and institutional weaknesses are compensated by exceptionally strong financial and monitoring controls. This allows for the emergence of more

sustainable (but naturally not perfect) structures. In the case of the Casamance program the approach remained focused on the delivery of results, of which capacity building was only an element.

6.3 Monitoring and Evaluation

The monitoring and evaluation of the Casamance program has followed the normal procedures as prescribed by USAID. The main weakness of these procedures is that in general only output indicators are monitored, and that few staffing resources are allocated - effectively for both programs there was only an expatriate staff member (the Program Coordinator), one national staff member (the Liaison Officer), and a driver, to handle all contractual and program issues over a very dense area.

The revision of the Casamance program Results Framework in May 2000 was part of a general change in procedures in USAID. The Agency asked the Missions to only articulate results that they were willing to be held accountable for. The Results Framework was thus changed to less ambitious objectives. To take an example, KIR II was changed from "Reconciliation and Peace Sustained" to "Improved Conditions for Local Level Conflict Reduction". It was believed that what USAID could realistically hope to accomplish was to improve conditions for local level conflict reduction. It was felt that there were too many factors, which could affect the chances of Sustained Reconciliation and Peace in the Casamance. Many of the factors were believed to be beyond the control and influence of the Casamance program.

The rationale is that the donor cannot control outcomes or key intermediate results. It is only possible to control outputs and therefore the only level that the donor can be held accountable for. This practice has consequences for the way implementing partners are monitored and evaluated. Implementing partners are often only capable of reporting on outputs in their quarterly, annual and final reports to USAID. The implementing partners are in general not reporting on outcome or impacts, at least not in a systematic way, as was demonstrated in the Office of the Inspector General report "Audit of USAID Senegal's Casamance Conflict Resolution Program, May 2003".

Individual partners are however encouraged to carry out their own assessments. The mid-term evaluation carried out by an independent consultant in collaboration with Concern is an example of good practice. It reports on impacts and it has a good analysis of strength as well as weaknesses of the program.

This is complemented by the active involvement of the two dedicated program staff. The strength of the monitoring system, as carried out by the Senegal Mission, is the spot checks in addition to the formal reporting. These spot checks of activity sites can be carried out with the implementing partner or unannounced, by national or international staff. They allow for consultation of beneficiaries or other concerned key stakeholders.

This practice, although not equally appreciated by all implementing partners, allowed USAID to remain well apprised of progress, as was demonstrated to the evaluation. Both implementing partners and beneficiaries have the impression that USAID is serious and interested. Some implementing partners, especially local partners, appreciate that monitoring forces them to be well organized in their administration of the projects.

No formal M&E system was established before 2004 for the WARP program. WARP's limited ability to monitor its partners in Gambia and Guinea-Bissau from Ghana was partly ameliorated through closer involvement of the USAID/Senegal mission. The SpO2 Casamance project assistant based in Ziguinchor did not monitor the WARP-financed projects, in spite of his geographical proximity to the project areas, although Dakar based staff did monitor sites on two occasions. As WARP has noted, one of the major drawbacks in their programming was "the lack of staff to coordinate its objectives both in the field and also managing program related activities."

The implementing partners mainly received monitoring visits from Ghana. M&E visits were originally scheduled to be at least twice every Quarter. However, shortfalls in funding for SO7 caused a reduction in number of visits in practice. However, virtual communication and phone conferencing were substituted to keep SO7 managers of the project in touch with the progress of each project.

WARP's Implementing Partners lamented the budget cuts which had reduced the level of staff present in the field. In the case of ADRA, the local partner for bee keeping had failed to compensate the beneficiaries for honey collected, a situation which the overstretched ADRA staff was not able to address. The Evaluation team saw only one monitoring report from the WARP Mission.

6.4 In summary

The programming in Casamance was very demand driven within a broad framework of results (in the sense that the NGOs determined the content of projects to a high degree inside the given sectoral definitions) which corresponds to the principles of local responsiveness in the face of a fluid situation.

At the same time it had the effect of creating a certain distance between the overall objectives as set out in the Results Framework and the actual implementation. Local dynamics, especially at the level of local NGOs, consisted predominantly in addressing the gradual disconnect between the evolving situation on the ground and the increasingly abstract results framework. This was exacerbated by the fact that most of the funds were allocated to projects by the end of 2003, which did not give the Mission the required flexibility to deal effectively with changes after that.

In addition the monitoring and evaluation system in place focused on outputs. This contributed to the difficulty for the Casamance program management to adjust the program in the implementation period. This difficulty was identified and deliberately addressed by USAID

through a practice of frequent field visits. The international NGOs could engage in this practice to a lesser extent due to the lack of personnel.

7. Assessment of Results Achieved

The evaluation team has analytically divided the program into components in order to examine the impact of each component on the conflict dynamic. These divisions combine partners and sectors, as well as regions. To have done the analysis using only one of the above mentioned categories would have been considerably more complicated, as the components correspond to conflict related objectives.

We analyze the performance of the components in relation to the objectives defined at the lower levels of the results frameworks (often based on Implementing Partner planning). In a second stage we turn to the conflict mapping to review the strength of the relation between the components and the drivers of the conflict – those key events and trends which have accelerated or reduced the conflict.

Our analytical distinction in components facilitated the assessment of outcomes and types of impact on the conflict. This was considered preferable to a geographic or actor based distinction, as ours is not an evaluation of each implementing partner or an evaluation of each individual project. The focus is on how different components relate to the conflict dynamic.

It is important to distinguish between quality of the program component in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, and then the impact of the component on the conflict. It is possible to have a situation where the quality of a component is very high. It can be efficient and effective in reaching its project goal and be of high value in meeting the needs of beneficiaries, but at the same time it may not have contributed significantly to the overall objective of creating enabling conditions for peace.

<i>Component</i>	<i>Activities</i>
Reconstruction of Community Infrastructure	Rehabilitation of houses and water sources
Building Economic livelihood	Income generation activities, microfinance, private sector, canoes, and agricultural projects.
Health	Anti-stress management, rehabilitation of mine victims, AIDS and malaria prevention projects.
Mine Awareness	Training of volunteers to carry out mine awareness session in their respective villages, mine awareness education to teachers and school children.

Conflict Resolution- local level	Youth leadership training, peace ambassadors, mediation centers, conflict resolution in and between villages
Conflict Resolution- political level	Improvement of negotiation skills

7.1 Reconstruction of Community Infrastructure

Quality:

Efficiency: small inputs were an appropriate response; only the roofing sheets or small scale construction, for example for the water wells, have been provided. Building the walls and foundation was done by the beneficiaries. This gives a good level of ownership and cost-savings to the results. The program was well complemented with other donor initiatives.

Effectiveness: This is high. The number of houses rehabilitated by end 2005 was 1310. The number of water sources rehabilitated by end 2005: 159. This is in line with the aspiration of responding visibly to the priority needs of the population in terms of living conditions. All respondents mention this as an important factor in their decisions, and houses are central to culture in Casamance.

Sustainability: The roofing sheets last a lot longer than traditional roofing material, in spite of noise during rainfall and poor insulation. However the most important aspects of sustainability have been the interest shown in respecting the village structures and culture (social capital in the erection of houses), locating people as close as possible to their areas of origin, and using local material as much as possible.

Link to conflict dynamic:

Reconstruction of infrastructure, particularly housing, has been identified by all key stakeholders both in the workshops and in the interviews as one of the main events for peace in the region (refugees from Tendine, an MFDC bastion, have described it as a “phenomenon” which they prized above fear¹³). The reconstruction of basic infrastructure made the return of refugees and IDPs possible. Many villagers stress that without external assistance for the reconstruction, return would not have been an option.

An assumption often made by observers is that peaceful solution to the conflict can not be found while refugees are still living in Gambia and Guinea Bissau.

The conflict has caused deeply rooted tension between ethnic groups to surface and intensify and those localized conflicts in villages and between villagers could only begin to be solved

¹³ The leader of the community traveled to the rebel leaders’ stronghold to ask that the returnees not be subjected to predatory activities. He is famously reported to have argued “*maintenant que la reconstruction a bien été entamée nous ne laisserons plus personne s’en prendre à nos acquis* »

when communities were reestablished in their former villages. Some spoke of the existence of sanctuaries for the rebels in refugee settlements. Moreover the presence of IDPs and refugees put pressure on host communities' physical infrastructure and natural resources, as well as generated some jealousies.

The villagers, interviewed by the evaluation team, have explained that the rehabilitation projects and the returnees have 'produced hope'. The mere fact that USAID as a donor returned to region and started the reconstruction was in itself a signal that peace was on its way, as noted in the conflict mapping workshops. Furthermore it encouraged other donors to return as well.

The reconstruction has in most cases been accompanied by conflict prevention and resolution measures. Different local organizations such as AJAEDO have held meetings in Gambia and Guinea Bissau to explain the conditions for return and to prevent potential conflicts over e.g. land and benefits from escalating. An organization such as ASACASE has done a great job persuading ex-rebels to return to their communities and persuading their former community members to accept and reintegrate them.

However the reconstruction of the village of Mpack is an example of how the program can produce mixed results. This spontaneous, villager-initiated reconstruction brought together displaced persons from the surrounding cross border areas and a new community was added onto an existing neighborhood. No resources were promised or allocated by USAID in the early phase of building. An unplanned commitment on behalf of US Ambassador Roth to the villagers for financial support to help with food aid during reconstruction made this particular village a priority for USAID and its implementing partners. This is a crucial weakness of this particular site. The site was not chosen after careful analysis and planning. It was a personality driven choice.

Mpack became another showcase (like Mandina Mancagne has previously been) because it was highly visible for all refugees and rebels alike to see the benefits of returning home and choosing peace. Nonetheless, the reconstruction generated some tension between villagers which was eventually addressed through several peacebuilding initiatives. The really unfortunate aspect of this case was the problem with landmine security in the surrounding areas, which limited access to agricultural lands. This eventually led to at least one accident when villagers went into high risk areas. The annex to this report (Annex 7) provides an assessment by HI on preliminary data, and tracks the villages believed to be mined against those rehabilitated. It shows that the Mpack level of risk was not an isolated case, and that USAID would have had difficulties finding safe villages for returnees¹⁴.

¹⁴ The Senegal Mission disagrees with this assessment, and would emphasize that the level of risk is not clear, while mitigation measures were taken. We reproduce here the full length of the comment received: "A protocol between CRS and HI was signed to review this very issue. The cooperative agreement was awarded based on the condition that safety be a critical variable in selection of villages. CRS worked with both the MFDC, the military, and local GOS administrative bodies in the selection of villages. HI definition of a landmine risk is extremely conservative and will show many currently inhabited villages as high risk even though they are functioning, inhabited places without any recent accidents. Mines are placed and then removed: but the entire area for 5-10 KM is deemed unsafe."

There are positive and negative sides to the story: villager initiative was rewarded and a high profile case was created and observed by many. Negative impacts include the landmine issue and the creation of demand without adequate resources to completely respond to the need. The small assistance from USAID was insufficient to meet the housing demand which in turn created unmet expectations and frustrations. There is still not enough housing (not enough tin roofs) to accommodate all the returnees although 100+ houses were roofed in 2004 Mpack lacked efficient planning and obligation of resources that are necessary in reconstruction projects.

In many border areas in the Casamance, there is an urgent need for mine clearance, including clearance of fields surrounding a village so that inhabitants can work the land for valuable crops, such as cashews (Ziguinchor region), or to get to the fields on the plateaus (Kolda region).

Significance of impact:

Relevance of impact (3 out of 3- HIGH)

- The mapping shows village rehabilitation to be one of the drivers to the conflict

Extent of impact rating (3 out of 3- HIGH)

- Many refugees and IDPs returned to their villages because of the reconstruction of basic infrastructure.

Duration of impact (2 out of 3- MEDIUM)

- Unmet needs can lead to tension and conflicts in the communities which limits the long term positive impact.
- Villagers are expected to stay in the village because of the reconstruction although problems with continued rebel attacks could cause new displacements.
- Lack of livelihood possibilities caused by surrounding mine could likewise lead to villagers moving away.

Significance (RxExD)

Relevance	Extent	Duration	Significance
3	3	2	18

Mission constraints: it is difficult to get an exact overview over the number of displaced and the number of people that wanted to return.

7.2 Building Economic Livelihood

Quality:

Efficiency: Most activities are low cost and efficient e.g. microfinance and training, and have generated considerable local interest.

Effectiveness: The outcomes of small scale economic activities in a context of continued structural isolation are limited. The results are to be found within the village communities, but do not appear to have affected the overall macroeconomic conditions (which are instead susceptible to the existence of trading routes, or access to land). Village level outputs are however favorable, as demonstrated by the following: the number of jobs created by the end of 2005: 6212 (number of accumulated jobs created by all implementing partners); number of village banks created are 87 (which is above target); alternative crops introduced (sesame) but problems with meeting targets on beneficiaries using new techniques (Africare, EnterpriseWorks) and low attendance at training sessions; high economic and non-monetary impact of pumps for irrigation for beneficiaries; jobs created in the cashew processing industry above target.

Sustainability: There is a traditional bias among Diola people against debt. The principles of microfinance need to be better explained to some groups. Some projects include local participation and ownership and they are targeted towards women which as a general rule make projects more sustainable. However it is likely that some training projects will not be sustainable without continued external financial and technical support

Link to the conflict dynamic

Building Economic Livelihood has a relation to key issues as defined in the conflict mapping such as reconstruction of basic community infrastructure, decreasing support to MFDC and eliminating the war economy.

Moreover most of the projects have a conflict resolution component. Most projects are run by a management committee that facilitates people to work together and solve problems as they arise.

Building economic livelihood does have an impact on the conflict by consolidating peace and stability. It may also be contributing to creating the “will” to solve the conflict. It is contributing to at least village level interaction. Whether it has contributed significantly to macro economic prosperity in the region is more doubtful.

However there are some issues which limit the positive impact of this component. Firstly the activities are spread over too many sectors and geographic areas without real coherence and creation of a critical mass. Secondly only few activities were targeted especially at young men in general and rebel or ex-rebels in particular. The ASACASE program is an exception. It targets youth and among them ex-combatants.

The activities are not always comprehensive in their approach. For example, in many cases there is a lack of transport opportunities for bringing vegetables from gardens to a market.

Illegal taxes imposed on traders coming from Guinea Bissau (often refugees who work in their fields on the other side of the border) were not quickly addressed by the applicable implementing partner, in spite of the impact on the program.

There are examples of lack of focus on the people most affected by the conflict. In the Western Division of Gambia the number of villages that benefited from the program went up drastically in a given program period without clear justification. The originally targeted villages, which were most affected by refugees actually needed more aid and follow up, did not get sufficient assistance because the aid was spread among too many villages.

The Western Division as an area of spread is an entry point and settlement for the refugees from the Casamance proper. The impact objective is not economic development per se but a contribution to the indicator “decreased human vulnerability as measured by a human security score card”. They also work to aid the integration of the refugees in the communities to have the means to satisfy their basic needs. The assistance followed settlements of the refugees within the Gambia and Guinea Bissau to ameliorate tensions and promote needs satisfaction of the host communities and those of refugees through integrated activities that were sustainable and involved the refugees.

Wealth creation was a second level effort for the sustainability of the conflict mitigation thus achieved. Concern Universal took steps to achieve this level by linking Restaurants and Vegetable buyers to the communities. Concern Universal also collaborated with the National Association of Credit Unions of the Gambia (NACAUG) to train the respective groups of women to create wealth through loans. With WARP approval the seed money was provided by CU. In Guinea Bissau ex- combatants were visibly integrated into activities of the women vegetable farmers. Both projects used cultural events to woo combatants to see peaceful living as an alternative life.

There are however concrete examples of cooperation between implementing partners such as the cooperation between Enterprise Works and Handicap International on marketing of cashew products that have been produced by handicapped people or between Enterprise Works and Africare on access to micro credit for a few pre-selected processors. Such cooperation is left to the initiative of the Implementing Partners, although is it encouraged by USAID (synergy meetings in 2002 and 2004.) There is an enormous potential in the Casamance for cashew production, in terms of jobs and income creation. An important obstacle to exploring that potential is the lack of access to credit and bank guarantees¹⁵.

Creating jobs for ex-combatants is an implicit or explicit goal in some projects proposals (CRS, ASACASE, AFRICARE). It was not possible for the evaluation team to tell how many of the jobs created have gone to ex-combatants as there are no records of this. At least not records available to the evaluation team.

¹⁵ See EnterpriseWorks Final report

There are examples of projects which have managed to target ex-combatants (Enterprise Works, CRS I, ASACASE). ASACASE has implemented a project directly targeted at younger age groups including ex-combatants. It aims to reduce youth unemployment by helping them to set and manage small income generating activities.

Significance of impact

Relevance of impact (2 out of 3- MEDIUM)

- Economic development is a significant grievance leading to conflict, but the program was only able to operate at the micro-level.

Extent of impact (2 out of 3 MEDIUM)

- The economic activities have created better living condition for people in the region. It has created over 6000 new jobs for as such it has had a positive impact on the conflict dynamic.
- There are however too few activities targeted at young men in general (gender sensitivity) and rebel/ex-rebels in particular; therefore it is not a real alternative to armed action and profitable activities such as cannabis growing and trafficking.
- There is a limit to how much economic activities can be expanded when there are still mines surrounding the villages making it difficult for villagers to access valuable crops such as cashew. However over 50 tons of cashews were processed and sold in local and international markets

Duration of impact (2 out of 3 MEDIUM)-

- too dispersed and micro level to have a real lasting impact

Significance (ExD)

Relevance	Extent	Duration	Significance
2	2	2	8

Mission constraints- It is very difficult to attract private sector investment in conflict zones.

7.3 Health

Quality:

Efficiency: Training is an efficient way to improve health conditions, and small scale support has avoided the temptation of substituting for weak service delivery in the region. Mobile clinics may have been an alternative in these border areas where there are a lot of population movements.

Effectiveness: The interventions by Handicap International met their targets in an impressive manner as can be seen in the reduction of mine incidents. Concern did not reach its targets: the

HIV/AIDS Prevention Workshops were not carried out and they have only reached 50% of the target in terms of health posts constructed. UNICEF or ADRA do not report on outcomes and as such it is not possible to say if they have realizing their respective objectives.

Sustainability: The health posts created by ADRA are established in collaboration with the Ministry of Health (MOH) and will be maintained by the MOH and therefore are as sustainable as can be in the context. The training is funded by USAID but the actual training is carried out by the MOH. The standard MOH training can benefit participants as they could also work in other governmental health posts. The new health posts established by Concern are well maintained.

Link to the conflict dynamic:

This component has a link to the conflict dynamic insofar as improving health services are part of rehabilitation of basic community infrastructure. Rehabilitation in general has been identified as a key issue in the conflict mapping.

Although most health posts continued to function in Casamance during the conflict some vaccination and prenatal care were disrupted or suspended in certain zones. Conflicts in general increase the risk of Sexually Transmitted Infections (STI) and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) due to population movements, military presence and increased poverty.

There has been increased pressure on health posts in the border villages of Gambia and Guinea Bissau where uprooted people have taken refuge and these areas have equally been exposed to the health risks that normally follow in the wake of population movements.

UNICEF has been the only health care provider funded by the Casamance program in the Casamance, with the addition of mine victim assistance by Handicap International. The specific objective of UNICEF was to improve primary health care services and thereby to contribute to the improvement of the health of particular vulnerable groups. UNICEF aimed to do that by providing training and equipment.

It is impossible to say if UNICEF reached its objective. The final report is very poor, as it only reports on outputs and not even on all the output indicators. It reports on the number of people that have received training in for example vaccination and AIDS prevention techniques but it does not report on the outcome of the training. As an example we do not even know if anybody actually received any vaccinations as results of the training. In addition the original proposal did not contain any baseline health data and it is therefore impossible to track any potential improvements in health conditions.

The health posts established by Concern have had positive impacts. Beneficiaries report positives changes such as a reduction in the cases of malaria and reduced transportation costs and time to a health center.

Handicap International carried out activities to improve the medico-technical and socio-economic reinsertion of handicapped persons. Improving services for handicapped persons in general and mine accident victims in particular do have an indirect link to the conflict dynamic. The interventions have been of high quality and are very visible in all locations, and have improved the standard of life for the people that benefited from them. However the link to the conflict dynamic is limited.

Significance of impact:

Relevance (2 out of 3- MEDIUM)

- Health has traditionally been lacking in the area, and the population has recourse to traditional healers
- The presence of health services is however seen as a sign of the interest of the GOS

Extent (1 out of 3 LOW)

- Improving health conditions in communities most affected by conflict or its consequences (IDPs or refugees) is generally relevant as it has a link to the conflict dynamic.
- None of the Implementing Partners have provided strong health data apart from Handicap International, public authorities are under funded, and improvement in health conditions is therefore difficult to detect
- The general health activities carried out have been limited in scope. Most of the health funding has gone to rehabilitation of mine victims.

Duration (1 out of 3 LOW)

- Improved health services have a long term positive effect on the living conditions of the populations especially if the improvement and maintenance is carried out in collaboration with local authorities and ministries. There is however no real evidence that the UNICEF project actually improved health services.

Significance (RxExD)

Relevance	Extent	Duration	Significance
2	1	1	2

Mission constraints- The Mission did not control funding (Leahy War Victim Fund) for the rehabilitation of mine victims. The decision was made in Washington while project management was carried out by the Mission.

7.4 Mine Awareness and Action

Quality:

Efficiency: unpaid sessions by volunteers have reached a very high number of people (many people know about the work by HI). There has been a very good use of local expertise and

structures in villages (for example teachers). The data on mine collected in the course of mine risk education (which constitutes an indirect mine survey method) was not used by the program.

Effectiveness: The drastic reduction in the number of mine and unexploded ordnance incidents (The number of accidents have gradually fallen from 197 in 1997 to 10 in 2005) demonstrates a high level of effectiveness of the HI activities.

Sustainability: The continuation of the work is relying on voluntary work, which has already posed some problems. There is no immediate prospect of national legislation and programs on mine action in the region.

Links to the conflict dynamic

Mine awareness has only a very indirect link to the conflict dynamic. It increases the feeling of security within a small perimeter, but the mines are still present, and there may even be an excessive sense of overall insecurity (no figures exist on the precise level of mine risk at the time of writing). There have been no initiatives in the field for de-mining by USAID. No studies or mapping exercises have been financed by USAID. A socio-economic impact study of mines in Casamance is currently being carried out by HI with financial support from CIDA and UNDP.

De-mining is an area which would have benefited from better donor coordination in relation with the Government policy. De-mining is a very expensive and sensitive matter, but clearly touches on the issue of the economic recovery of the region. Jointly financed studies or joint pressure on Government of Senegal to live up to its promises of mine clearance may have produced better results than micro-finance and mine awareness (even though the evidence is that this theme was brought in meetings between officials of the US government and the government of Senegal, the outcomes are not clear at this point in time).

Significance of impact:

Relevance (1 out of 3- LOW)

- Mines are an important driver of the conflict, but mine risk education has only affected the sense of security, not the threat level.

Extent (2 out of 3- MEDIUM)

- The program has reached many people and trained them in how to avoid mine accidents, which has given the population a sense of security in some areas.

Duration (1 out of 3 LOW)

- The mine awareness project is to some extent a first step in the de-mining process. However to improve the security situation related to mines an actual mine clearance has to take place, and before this there may be a prevailing perception of insecurity. Government policy is still undetermined.

Significance (ExD)

Relevance	Extent	Duration	Significance
1	2	1	2

Mission constraints- de-mining was originally part of the list of activities envisaged by the Mission (see SpO concept paper). However actual de-mining has to be carried out either by the Government of Senegal or with strong support from the Government of Senegal. The result has been an effective humanitarian program with limited peace-building impact.

7.5 Conflict Resolution on Local Level

Quality:

Efficiency: Most projects were very low cost. They relied on local culture to an extent rarely witnessed in other areas of Africa (use of magic, strong sense of the cultural meaning of certain ceremonies, persons and places).

Effectiveness: The projects are of a varied quality in terms of meeting their objectives. World Education (Capacity Building of Youth Organisations, Cultural weekends) PADCP (the seed project), CRS (Conflict resolution in Mpack- CACEC) are examples of projects that have successfully reached their objectives.

Sustainability: Most projects have been carried out by local grass root organizations which increase local ownership and sustainability. However the degree to which certain aspects are correctly understood is not clear, such as the psycho-social programs. To be sustainable this would require long term involvement.

Link to conflict dynamics:

The component as a whole has links to key issues in the Casamance conflict such as land ownership conflicts, strengthening of civil society and improvement of peace efforts on both local and political level. There are links from the local level to "Peace Writ Large"¹⁶. Experience shows that when local peace building projects can respond to one or more of these criteria listed below (taken from "Peace Writ Large") it is likely that they contribute to creating peace on the broader level of society.

1. The effort caused the participants and communities to develop their own initiatives for peace
2. The effort results in the creation or reform of political institutions to handle grievances that fuel the conflict
3. The effort prompts people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to violence
4. The effort results in an increase in the population's security

¹⁶ See reference to "Peace Writ Large" in the literature review.

Some of the projects did lead to people “taking their own initiatives”. Many village level institutions were weakened or did not function during the war thereby depriving rural communities of their capacity to manage local conflicts. Some of these village associations have been revived with financial support from USAID, and these associations have consequently taken initiative in the form of traditional religious ceremonies to pardon and reintegrate e.g. young men associated with MFDC in the community.

Another project such as the “Seed Project” has successfully taught local grass roots organizations (such as Kabonkatoor) conflict resolution skills that they have used for further reconciliation purposes in villages divided over support to MFDC. These efforts of integrating ethnic groups or individuals belonging to or associated with the rebel movement in their former communities have in turn resulted in an increase in people’s security.

The creation of local conflict prevention committees in the communities have prevented local conflict from escalating and prompted people to resist violence. Other initiatives following from the “Seed project” have addressed deep rooted tension between farmers and herders over resources such as land and water by trying to ensure that local councils enforce the law properly.

Cultural weekends have been organized in both the Western Division in Gambia and in Casamance. These events bring people together not only to share culture but also to resolve issues such as ethnic tension and discrimination of refugees. It provides a forum where people are able to speak out and share grievances related to the conflict. People became gradually more open from one event to the next and talked more directly about conflict issues. These events have played an important role in demonstrating to both MFDC and Government of Senegal that the population in the region is “fed up” and that they are not supporting the armed struggle anymore. The weekends have also brought together key stakeholders such as village leaders, Government of Senegal and MFDC for meetings and discussions.

A few examples highlight the risk that such initiatives can be the product of a western approach that does not have a real impact in traditional communities. One example is the children that act as peace ambassadors (Gambia) but where peace messages are not in actual fact passed from children to grown ups. Another example is the anti-stress management (Zinguinchor) where participants are supposed to be able to deal with potentially serious cases of post war trauma after a few days of training. Finally the revived village committees may not be the most appropriate forum for conflict resolution. It is often the traditional healers (Marabouts) that end up solving the conflicts instead (e.g. conflict over borrowed land in Cherif Kunda in Guinea Bissau).

Another weak point is the lack of donor coordination. Some of the good work may be discontinued because new donors want to enforce their own methods and techniques. Some local organizations in the Kolda region have ensured funding from PROCAS to continue the local conflict resolution work. However PROCAS will ask the organizations to use other

methods than the ones that the organizations have adopted after having participated in the “Seed project”.

Civil society organizations working on local peace building projects have in general been strengthened. When the Casamance program started back in 2000, CRS had difficulties finding local partners with credible experience and motivation; now quite a few organizations have acquired such valuable experience. This contrasts with the impact on the capacity of local level delivery Casamance NGOs.

Civil society mediators has developed as a result of the program. Mediators from organizations such as World Education, St Joseph’s Farm, APRAN, and Kabonkator have played an important role in facilitating meeting and negotiation with MFDC (internally rebel fraction) and between MFDC and Government of Senegal.

An objective of some of the projects implemented by partners such as ASACASE and CRS have been to support ex-combatants to engage in peace building activities in the communities. It is difficult to say to which extent they have succeeded in reaching this goal. The local peace building activities are not targeted especially at ex-combatants. Some records or statistic are reported to be kept by implementing partners on how many ex-combatants have engaged in peace building activities at community level. These records are however not available to the public because singling out ex-combatants may stigmatize them and could be counter productive. The statistics were not made available to the evaluation team.

There are however examples of how mediators from, among others, St Joseph’s farm, have succeeded in converting MDRC rebels into supporting local school projects in the border areas (or at least obtained a guarantee that MDRC would refrain from attacking them.) This is an unintended effect of the program that has had a very positive impact on the conflict dynamic.

An initiative such as the capacity building of youth associations (World Education) is directly targeted to young people. It aims at improving the social role of youth by mixing cultural and sporting events with among others reflection workshops. It has a cross border dimension to it as well. The youth association visited by the evaluation team had successfully included a micro project on commercialization of cashew to profit the association. However in general the project provided limited funds for micro projects. That was a limited factor for the viability of the project as a whole.

An important objective of the WARP program was to relieve the burden of refugees on host communities in Gambia and Guinea Bissau in the hope of reducing tension and discrimination of refugees. The evaluation team did not find evidence of hostility towards the refugees in the communities at this point although there are unresolved issues related to for example land rights.

Concern Universal, WARP’s implementing partner working in the Gambia, collaborated with the African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights (PRAWA) in setting up mediation centers

as an alternative to the criminal justice system which is often biased against refugee defendants¹⁷. The mediation centers are among others dealing with land right conflicts and the structure is appreciated by the villagers as an “effective, friendly and fair way of solving conflicts”.

Significance of impact

Relevance of impact

- This is high due to the importance of village level conflict within the broader spectrum of violence.

Extent of impact: (3 out of 3 HIGH)

- Different local level initiatives have overall contributed to creating better conditions for peace. People are finally able to speak about the conflict and many civil society organizations have been strengthened and are better equipped to deal with local conflicts. Some of the original drivers of the conflict between the region of Casamance as such and Government of Senegal are however unsolved and will continue to create conflicts such as the land tenure issue and the lack of local ownership of the public administration. Decentralization and reform of public administration has hardly been addressed in the Casamance program

Duration of impact: (3 out of 3 MEDIUM)

- The program has strengthened civil society in a way that is likely to last well beyond the program..
- There are however links between the local projects and conflict resolution at high level. People are watching leaders take initiatives to increasingly resist violence.
- Strengthening of civil society. Many local grass roots organizations have been empowered and this leads to sustainability.

Significance (ExD)

Relevance	Extent	Duration	Significance
3	3	3	27

Mission constrains- Small grass root initiatives are difficult to manage.

7.6 Conflict Resolution on the Political Level

Quality:

¹⁷ See Concern Midterm Evaluation July 2005

Efficiency: the workshops were carried out by PADCO which is a for-profit organization. A general observation on the choice of actors is that for-profit organizations are in general more expensive in terms of labor and logistics costs than NGOs, but more efficient due to the significance given to cost control. It is probable that there were no NGOs that were both available and able to carry out this type of activity, which required close coordination with USAID.

Effectiveness: The workshop reached its objectives according to the PADCO monitoring except for the lack of success in getting the military wing of MFDC to participate.

Sustainability: The negotiators on both sides change often and there is therefore a need for more training if it is to be sustainable.

Link to conflict dynamics

Improvement of the negotiation skills of key actors (Government of Senegal and MFDC) on both sides of the conflict is directly linked to the key issue of improving high level peace efforts and signing of peace agreements. The workshop session for Government of Senegal representatives has been appreciated by the Government of Senegal that has expressed interest in participating in other workshops in the future.

The workshop with civil society and especially the “seed project” that was a direct result of the workshop has been very appreciated by the participants who have successfully applied the new skills for local level conflict resolution. The civil society actors are not directly involved in negotiations but an organization like Kebankator has carried out a targeted advocacy campaign to get high level MFDC and leaders from the Government of Senegal to negotiate.

The fact that a workshop of this kind was carried out at all is a success in itself. It was the first time a high level initiative of this kind was welcomed by President Wade. The US Embassy lead by Ambassador Roth was actively involved in the program preparations which was a contributing factor in ensuring Government of Senegal support. It was however not enough to ensure the participation of the MFDC military faction which stayed away all together.

The Government of Senegal made a drastic change in mid-2003 that led to an opening up of the Casamance conflict. This provided a window of opportunity for a programming shift, to which USAID was slow to respond. By mid-2004, USAID was able to take advantage of the changed situation and started to formulate the negotiation and conflict resolution capacity-building activity that targeted Government of Senegal, MFDC, and CSO key stakeholders for a direct peace-process/peace negotiation support.

However if the activity had been initiated already in mid-2003 it would for example have given PADCO more time to try to ensure the presence of the military fraction of MFDC at the workshop. The duration of the training activity was probably too short to achieve all its potential impact, as reported by many informed respondents.

Significance of impacts

Relevance (3 out of 3- HIGH)

- The channels of communication between the parties in conflict are clearly open, but issues of negotiating position, transparency of conclusions, and levels of trust, feature highly in the decisions they make. This means that high level facilitation is central to the leadership initiatives on all sides.

Extent: (1 out of 3 LOW)

- USAID has only taken one overt initiative to address conflict resolution on the political level. The PADCO workshops did have many key stakeholders as participants. It brought together MFDC political leaders who had not communicated for years. However a key stakeholder such as the military wing of MFDC did not participate. Other implementing partners have worked behind the scene on political level negotiations (World Education, Kebankator, APRAN)
- Duration: (2 out of 3 MEDIUM)
- The workshops carried out so far will not in itself have a long lasting impact especially since the negotiators from the Government of Senegal have since changed. However there a demand for more training from the Government and as such there is a longer term perspective.

Significance (ExD)

Relevance	Extent	Duration	Significance
3	2	2	12

Mission constraints-Bureaucratic slowness in being able to respond to changing political conflict dynamics

7.7 In Summary

	Extent	Duration	Significance
Recontruction of Community infrastructure	3	2	18
Building of Economic Livelihood	2	2	8
Health	1	1	2
Mine Awareness/Action	2	1	2
Conflict Resolution Local Level	3	3	27

Conflict Resolution Political Level	2	2	12
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8. Findings and Recommendations

8.1 Management Level Findings

Strategic intent

The program focused on a significant element of the political and economic dynamic of Senegal in the past few years, one that has conditioned its international image and overall stability. The ability to combine internal and cross-border operations, and to bring to bear a significant amount of resources and programming and delivery capacity, has been an important factor of overall success.

Locally the programs' performance was constrained by an absence of steering in programming terms, in other words by the fact that priorities were determined very early on, in relation to partner mandates or specialties, and not to shifting conditions. The identification of the conflict drivers was very broad, and even though relevance is good, the extent and especially duration of impact was constrained.

For security and political reasons an in-depth conflict analysis or baseline study was not possible in the programming phase in 2000. However smaller mapping workshops could have been undertaken before new agreements were signed as political conditions as well as security condition had changed around 2003, leading to new programming.

The consequence was a program with a good focus on sectors of intervention, but the breadth of activities funded does not allow for the creation of a focus of benefits for needs most relevant in some areas and some moments in time. The program in effect committed itself early on, without maintaining a reserve of funds or an analytical capacity to complement and revise approaches.

Interestingly this sector by sector definition of objectives contrasts with the way in which the program is effectively implemented at the local level. Here many local NGOs are involved in a number of components, and their apt geographical focus is their predominant characteristic (rather than, for example, health, construction, etc...). There is, beyond the USAID planning skeleton of the results and objectives, a local appropriation of the rationale for the selection of projects. This appropriation focuses on local level conflict resolution, rebuilding of villages and communities, and attracting resources and people locally, which strengthens the depth of impact.

Yet the Senegal and WARP programs were not passive by any stretch of the imagination, and under this steering process, staff made innovative decisions. The decision to launch an APS in 2000 was highly appropriate. It helped USAID identify as many potential partners as possible, combine reconciliation with development, and it gave potential partners the opportunity to

propose innovative activities that were solidly rooted in the local context. Later when USAID knew better what needed to be done other instruments such as RFP and RFA were used.

However the final result is that some opportunities were unmet, particularly at the end of the programming period, as USAID struggled to cobble together budgets to address new issues. We have mentioned the need for more houses in 2005, or the advocacy for demining, and we believe it might be possible to even actually undertaking demining activities from 2006.

The key cross-border issues such as illicit trade and flows of small arms, were not addressed by WARP, which could have, as a first stage, supported some small scale studies as has been done in Angola and Congo. Some of these risks to peace may have been reduced if funding had been better structured in phases, to continue selecting partners and activities over the program period when access to information was more easily available.

Revisiting implementation modalities

The projects that resulted from both the RFP (PADCO) and RFA (ASACASE- employment alternatives for youth at risk, World Education-capacity building of youth associations, CRS-reconstruction) were among the most appropriate and well targeted. Using the instruments of RFP and RFA instead of responding to unsolicited proposals may have led to better impact.

One example of an unsolicited proposal was the direct result of an Embassy commitment. Ambassador Roth made an unplanned promise to local villagers when on a field visit in the region. This unplanned promise of assistance was made to Mpack later had to be honored by USAID. Such rapid selection of beneficiaries and activities can have a negative effect on the strategic coherence of activities. It is naturally difficult to capture the implicit strategy in an evaluation taking place years after the fact.

For the WARP program a RFP was launched in 2002. It was established as an umbrella grant mechanism. WARP was looking for an International NGO in Gambia and Guinea Bissau to oversee the program and to give small grants to local organizations for peace-building and economic development projects. Some illustrative examples of activities were given. The RFP was basically written to enable a response from the few international organizations in the respective areas, which means that this tended to continue programs that were already in existence.

The funding under the WARP program was given in phases, which means that Concern and ADRA had to submit a new application every year. This practice has implications for their programming: it makes it difficult to plan and it is a heavy administrative burden on the organizations. For the third phases both organization had counted on \$ 500,000 but they effectively received only \$ 300,000 (due to budget reductions decided at USAID headquarters). ADRA has therefore had difficulties to continue the scale of activities with its local partners.

For both Senegal and WARP programs, a good overview was made difficult by the many levels of implementation (a minimum of three except for the PADCO conflict resolution which had two sub-contracts), and by the complexity of activities. This was partly compensated by some geographical division of labor at the local level (for example using only two local partners in Oussouye), supported by frequent staff visits to the field - a mechanism which was more difficult to achieve in the case of WARP than the Senegal mission, because of physical distance.

Local management

The evaluation finds that the single most important factor of good performance was the ability to access local knowledge. The presence of two USAID employees on the ground based out of Ziguinchor (and with detailed knowledge of the region), and the proximity to the Embassy staff for diplomatic purposes, provided the Mission with high level access. This was then replicated through the management chain thanks to a prolonged program implemented over many years.

The international NGOs in Casamance, Gambia and Guinea Bissau have implemented the activities through or in collaboration with a large number of local grass root organizations. Concern alone has nine local partners. The quality of the administrative capacities of the organizations is varied but the evaluation team witnessed the work of many good local partners solidly rooted in the local context.

The international NGOs were to a large extent tasked with the relations to the Senegalese NGOs, which may have contributed to less strategic coherence along the chain, as objectives were gradually translated into outputs which had been defined at an early point in time. This was however compensated over time. The administrative capacity of some local NGOs has to some extent improved during the program period and USAID was able to fund some local NGOs such as ASACASE directly in the second round of funding.

The evaluation found however a limited division of labor between the implementing partners. Many of the local NGOs would work within all sectors from food distribution, vegetable gardens to reconstruction and peace building on different level. Their expertise clearly is local access, while the number of sectors was not always justified by programming objectives. USAID set up an Internet Forum for coordination and exchange of ideas related to the Casamance conflict. The forum was actively used by NGOs and other stakeholders until two years ago when projects started coming to an end. The organizations have a useful forum to exchange ideas but it did not solve the problem of lack of coordination, neither did regular coordination meetings between partners and USAID which tended to focus on implementation information exchanges.

There has been a good cooperation between the US Embassy and USAID Mission especially in the period from January 2003 to late spring 2005 where Richard Allan Roth was US Ambassador to Senegal. The very visible involvement of the US Ambassador at the time was an important contribution to the definition of the overall objectives, and to allowing USAID to operate in a sensitive area of the country.

This diplomatic drive had a significant impact on the dynamic at the time and it helped drive for example the PADCO initiative forward. There are however two problems with such involvement. Ambassador Roth was only there for two years, and his departure has left a gap. The US Embassy has been less visible in Casamance after his farewell tour in the region in April 2005. The other problem is linked to the first. The involvement of the Ambassador in the reconstruction of the village of Mpacak is an example of how diplomatic participation in development work can have negative as well as positive impacts.

The strategy behind the WARP program has also been relevant to the extent that the Casamance conflict has produced problems on both sides of the borders, and cross-border programs were highly relevant. The activities carried out under the two programs are very similar. However The supervision of the WARP program from the Mission in Ghana has been insufficient and the formal coordination between the Mission in Ghana and the Mission in Senegal was non existing until 2004. Some of the cross-border issues, such as trade, or the employment of potential combatants, were not pursued by WARP.

8.2 Strategic Level Findings

The strategy of enabling conditions for peace via economic, social and political development organized in small grants at the local level was very relevant. A large scale program covering many sectors through a bilateral and a regional program was an effective way to implement the strategy. The information collected by this evaluation points to high levels of verifiable evidence concerning the existence of a link between peace and the achievements of USAID programs.

The strategy also helped launch the return of other donors, and this effect on other donors is one overall impact that needs to be mentioned. The region was economically drained and the social fabric of the communities was severely damaged after more than 20 years of conflict. More than 60.000 people had become uprooted and 240 villages had been destroyed. The population was becoming increasingly “fed up” but needed external assistance for the physical and social rehabilitation of the communities. USAID started its \$ 10 million program at a crucial time and the reconstruction efforts have encouraged many of the uprooted people to return and start rebuilding their communities;

USAID was faced in the early phase with a serious constraint in its programming due to the limited “license to operate” and had to set priorities. The Casamance conflict was defined by the Government as essentially a political problem. However facilitation of high level political negotiations was not deemed possible when the program started in 2000 as external interference in the conflict was not welcomed by the President of Senegal. The programming was also restricted by the lack of conflict analysis or conflict mapping over the program cycle, for political or security reasons.

Hence the program gradually moved from an economic development focus to a more political one. The main impact was found by the evaluation to be in the area of symbols, and economic

incentives: to provide evidence of the quick benefits of taking the road to peace and stability. Yet paradoxically the need for rapid execution, and for overtly socio-economic programs, limited over time the range of options open to USAID.

As the context changed, this efficiency and relevance of the Casamance program was limited by the fact that the programs were not able to adjust to new conditions. The possibility of operating around issues deemed more sensitive in the past (such as mines) could not be pursued. USAID had not laid out the assumptions and targets behind the program strategy very clearly, which resulted in some activities being allocated to certain actors, while these actors sought to expand into a variety of sectors and operate with a variety of implementers. Some stakeholders situated near the Gambian border and Kolda felt that most attention was given to Ziguinchor, a perception confirmed by the density of activity sites (while the mapping of the conflict would tend to show that the drivers are located also to the north and east of Ziguinchor, as well as along the coast).

The component that has had the strongest impact on changing the conflict dynamic has been the local level conflict resolution initiatives. It has helped solve many local conflicts and has contributed to restoring the social fabric in the villages. The program has not had a strong impact on political negotiations as it has only had one overt activity addressed at high level negotiations. Another component that has had a strong impact on the conflict dynamic has been the rehabilitation of the basic community infrastructure that allowed the uprooted people to return to their villages. Building economic livelihood has also had a positive impact in giving people an incentive to choose peace over conflict. The extent of the health intervention has been small and has had little impact. Almost 10% of the total budget has been spent on mine awareness and rehabilitation of mine victims that have little direct impact on the conflict dynamic.

An important success of the program has been the economic and social empowerment of the poorest population. A key driver of conflict has to do with the cultural and economical isolation of a region that has been administrated and controlled by central authorities in Dakar. The lack of local control over land and development resources has been one of the major drivers of conflict and a strengthening of civil society and local control over economic resources has been identified by stakeholders and the population as a step (albeit a small one) toward solving the conflict. In these areas the program has only begun to achieve impact, and would need to be scaled up.

The program has contributed to a situation where the population has taken more often the initiative to resolve conflicts in villages and between villages, and where local mediators from civil society have taken own initiatives to facilitate meetings between factions in MFDC, and between MFDC and the Government of Senegal.

However some significant drivers mentioned in mappings, the presence of unexploded ordnance and mines, the prevalence of small arms and of illicit trade, remain. Similarly there have been no direct efforts to support demobilization and public information campaigns

towards armed groups. These drivers present the most significant challenges to the achievement of the objectives of peace. They are newly more amenable to external influence, and have not yet been addressed under the Senegal and WARP programming.

8.3. Generic Findings and Recommendations

The region still needs external assistance and investments in economic, social and political development to consolidate nascent peace. With its own distinct culture and opportunities, Casamance offers an important contrast with the broader dynamics of conflict and peace in the country and in the region, and as such deserves to be better known and assisted.

The direction the mission should take in its future programming, if it is to learn from the programs implemented and build on the foundation it has already laid in the Casamance, is to reduce the detail of results and objectives it sets out in its early programming documents, and instead strengthen the definition of those ‘drivers’ or ‘brakes’ it wants to target. This will not necessarily mean lower accountability. It can be compensated on the one hand through a process of regular monitoring of those drivers of peace and conflict. This will then be used to mobilize resources to address possible shortfalls and new needs as these emerge.

For the mission/institution to manage a conflict program more effectively it needs to focus in a more detailed manner on the way in which the program is appropriated at the local level. This local orientation may reflect a different definition of priorities, for example defined in geographical rather than sectoral terms, or it may reflect a greater importance given to certain sectors, such as rebuilding social capital (conflict resolution, communication) and infrastructure (houses, roads). This should be capitalized on as an asset to increase ownership and hence mobilization and efficiency.

The evaluation team sees as the main strength of the USAID design and management of the Casamance program the creation of an overall strategy made of two programs including different modalities and agencies, facilitated by high level diplomatic leverage. The ability to monitor developments at the local level is also a strength in the case of the Senegal mission.

The main weakness relates to the absence of strategic monitoring and adjustment in the program to changing conditions on the ground. The number of sectors of activity did not allow a concentration on the more promising components (sectors are linked to agencies and to contracts, and cannot be phased out).

Results based management may not be the most appropriate guiding tool for management of a conflict program where circumstances and objectives can change suddenly, and clearly identified goals can pre-judge the content of the peace is being sought. More flexible management tools such as issue based management could be a way forward. The approach we have chosen for the evaluation, which is to focus on the factors which lead a situation to change in certain directions could be considered.

We would recommend the following steps in the future for Casamance:

- There is presently a situation of no war/no peace in the Casamance and the sub region, and there is not yet a final political solution to the conflict. USAID and the US Embassy in Senegal should continue to play an important role as facilitators, alongside other donors. This should include emphasizing more political and cross-border aspects of the conflict dynamics, which had been left outside the development sphere due to a different political environment initially.
- The evaluation has confirmed the link between development activities and resolving conflict in terms of creating more willingness to negotiate at all levels. This confirms the need to continue to extend USAID development activities to Casamance. The next stages of USAID targeted peace-building should furthermore address the other drivers of the conflict previously not sufficiently addressed which are contributing to the ongoing instability: cross-border exchanges, elimination or marking of anti-personnel mines, housing, public information. The economic incentives for demobilization also require more identification, in a first stage, and subsequent support.
- The main focus of the program is to be found in the importance of providing substantial development inputs into the region, with the dual aim of creating an incentive for peace talks, and generating a sense of return to normality and social reintegration for the local population. The value of USAID programs was complemented successfully in general by US Embassy peace efforts. However in one case (Mpack) the involvement of the Embassy produced negative results. USAID need to stand firm on its own agenda of careful local planning and adjustment as a precondition for long term development.
- To capitalize on the existing access of different Implementing Partners to specific population groups, USAID should design a distribution of tasks according to an overall logic. This logic should be either related to assigning objectives to a driver of the conflict, or to a geographical region. This would facilitate the monitoring of results, avoid competition between partners, and allow for a better organization of the types of expertise involved.
- USAID has successfully strengthened local development actors in Casamance and has thereby given the local people more say over the use of the resources in the region. Local control over resources could be secured further if USAID made a priority out of supporting the decentralization process as a means of achieving more local control. It could be activities that involved both the population (in particular a sustained strategy of building up local NGOs) and local government. This would include not only the provision of financial resources, but the twin services of technical programming advice, and financial controls.
- Land tenure and use is another key driver of conflict that still needs to be addressed. Some of the conflicts over land originate from the land reforms in the 1960s and from what is locally perceived as theft of land by northerners. Population movements both in Casamance and in the border regions are continuously causing conflicts over eg. borrowed land. Other conflicts derive from traditional rifts between herders and farmers. This would require development of a governance component dealing with land registration, access to justice for

rural populations, and possible compensation schemes in cases of irreconcilable differences between customary and national law on these issues. This will clearly require close monitoring, and consequently the elaboration of a strong implementation mechanism.

- USAID should capitalize on the new wealth of local grass root organizations and the Agency's comparative advantage in local conflict resolution to further dialogue on decentralization, the role of local government and land tenure and use. This is a continuation of the existing work carried out by a number of organizations, which are not necessarily those usually identified as conflict resolution NGOs, but may depict themselves in rural development terms. They should be encouraged to define in their own terms the word "peace-building" which tends to confuse the issues, and is symptomatically used in English with limited local meaning.
- USAID program monitoring is highly dependent on implementing partner reporting, which is of very limited quality. USAID should carry out periodic conflict impact reviews aside from normal results reporting, focusing on drivers of conflict. This should be seen as distinct from the project output-based reporting stream, and starts from the environment of the program primarily to review the significance of impacts. It then permits adjustments in objectives at the level of projects to ensure conflict sensitivity in development and effectiveness for peace-building.
- As for most aid donors, USAID has limited powers to adapt and adjust the program after an agreement with an implementing partner has been signed. A phased program therefore has to be ensured at the outset when selecting partners and activities. Proposals and subsequent agreements should be reviewed under a single broad (secured) financial allocation, detailed enough to give USAID a good indication of expected results as these evolve. It is at this stage that USAID has to make sure that the partners and activities at least in theory are well matched, and that no important needs are ignored.
- More strategic management would occur if USAID gave funding in phases where implementation priorities are identified and in-depth dialogue with the implementing partner is encouraged. Funding is accordingly adjusted, as has been done to a limited extent for WARP. In this way some funds might be made available to seize new opportunities. This could lead to new sub-priorities being defined over the life of the Casamance program, and a new selection of partners.

Annexes

Annex 1 Scope of Work

I. Purpose of the Evaluation

The purpose of this evaluation is to identify whether the implementation of USAID/Senegal Casamance Special Objective (SpO2) fostered peacebuilding in the Casamance and created a foundation for post-conflict development. More specifically, it seeks to determine the extent to which SpO2 had a measurable impact on the mitigation of the conflict in the Casamance region. In turn, this is part of a broader question: “What is the relationship between development programs and resolving/mitigating conflict?”

To address this question, the evaluation will analyze the SpO2 program’s relevance in mitigating the conflict. The evaluation will also analyze what was done from 1999 until December 2005, period under which two separate strategic frameworks were funded for the USAID SpO2, and the rationale for funding such choices. The first funding amounted to US\$ 10 million for the period 1999-2002 and the second funding amounted to over US\$ 18 million for the period 2002-2005. Additionally it will appraise the effectiveness of the programming options made and comment on the effectiveness of the results obtained. Finally it will determine the impact of the activities undertaken from a selection of projects to be visited under specific purposive sampling criteria, and will further analyze whether or not these activities had linkages with the conflict mitigation specific objective

The information garnered from this evaluation will be used to appraise the current strategy as it draws to an end, to formulate evidence based recommendations for the upcoming Senegal mission strategy in light of the repercussions of Casamance conflict, and to illuminate lessons learned about how, when, and under what circumstances similar program options might be successful. The goal of the final report is to identify key factors which must be considered in future USAID/Senegal and USAID/WARP programming activities not only in the Casamance, but throughout the sub-region.

Overall, the evaluation will contribute to USAID’s capacity to design and measure the impact of conflict programs and contribute to the literature linking development programs and conflict. The expected audience for this evaluation will be the Senegal mission, WARP mission, Africa Bureau (Conflict Mitigation and Resolution), DCHA/Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, and members of the African development community working in conflict zones. The evaluation report will therefore be made available publicly.

II. Background

A. Conflict Programming

Conflict is a reality for millions of people. Not only does it directly affect the livelihoods of individuals, it also has an impact on society in general by quickly erasing decades of

development progress. Thus for development to be sustainable, the roots of conflict must be adequately understood and incorporated into program design. In recent years the international development community has come to realize that to be effective, programming in conflict zones must take into account the unique conditions of these zones. These conditions can include:

1. an unstable political environment;
2. limited or nonexistent government capacity and institutions;
3. destroyed markets;
4. extensive infrastructure damage (factories, farms, roads);
5. devastated agriculture sector;
6. depleted resource base;
7. significant contraction of the legal economy;
8. expansion of the illegal economy;
9. high unemployment;
10. concentration of wealth and resources in the hands of a few; and
11. reversion to subsistence activities for a majority of the population.

On a programming level, activities to address these conditions and foster sustainable development can be divided into those that *directly* focus on conflict prevention/reconciliation, and those that *indirectly* address the underlying economic and social conditions that foster conflict.

Due to the relatively nascent status of research on the extent of linkages between development programs and conflict prevention and resolution, there is a dearth of theory and lessons learned with which to design, implement, and measure program impact. Many conflict-related activities are currently being implemented throughout the developing world, although few have been rigorously evaluated and/or had their lessons communicated to the larger development community.

The difficulties associated with measuring peacebuilding programs – and the corresponding lack of conceptual and programming guidance currently available – is the result of two major obstacles: First, every conflict has its own unique dynamics, which are shaped by prevailing economic, political, and social conditions. Although conflicts share commonalities, there is no single programming strategy that can be implemented in every situation. Thus, program options must match specific conditions, necessitating a thorough evaluation of causes of the conflict before creating such programs.

The second major hurdle is accurately measuring the impact of conflict programming in a conflict zone. Specific challenges include:

1. obtaining reliable pre-intervention data (baseline data);
2. the dynamic, constantly changing nature of conflicts, in which many events occur “behind the scenes”;
3. involvement of a large number of peacebuilding/development actors;
4. results which might only take place after an activity/intervention has ended;
5. nature of the impact is often based in positive changes in relationships, which are very difficult to quantify; and
5. the role of external actors.

These obstacles notwithstanding, because of the importance of the issue, there is a strong need for a comprehensive analytical framework to evaluate the causality, effectiveness, and impact of conflict related programming. Such a framework would give development specialists the foundation they need to design more effective conflict related interventions.

B. The Conflict in the Casamance

The Casamance conflict has gone through many phases in the last 23 years. It started as a popular independence movement to address perceived economic and political discrimination by Dakar and its dominant Wolof ethnic group. The main parties to the conflict are the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) and the Government of Senegal (GOS). The conflict started in 1982 when violent clashes after a peaceful demonstration led to an armed rebellion by members of the dominant Diola ethnic group against the government. Between 1982 and 1998, there were numerous clashes in the region. This led to the end of most donor activity in the region.

Externally, the conflict has been affected by the close ethnic and historical ties between people in the Casamance, Gambia, and Guinea Bissau. Borders are fluid and a large part of the population in the region has relatives in other countries. This has facilitated the flow of refugees to neighboring states. At the governmental level, the involvement of both Guinea-Bissau and the Gambia has played a role in the crisis since the beginning. Internally, the MFDC began to fragment in the mid 1990s. In spite of this fragmentation, in late 1999 a cease-fire was signed and an agenda for negotiations was outlined. However, after winning the 2000 presidential election, President Wade did not pursue the agenda outlined by his predecessor. This led to a resumption of fighting.

By 2002, the Casamance population was tired of the conflict and the squabbling between MFDC factions. Support for an independent state declined and numerous demonstrations called for an end to the war. However, the creation of a “war economy,” with various groups gaining control of cashew plantations, tree/timber products, and illegal marijuana fields, created a constituency with little incentive to end the conflict.

To facilitate an end to the conflict, in 2003, the GOS/World Bank created a plan for the resumption of development programs in the Casamance. Specific activities included demining, demobilization, infrastructure rehabilitation, and local development. In 2004 the GOS increased its administrative presence in the region. This fostered a power struggle between military and political leaders of the MFDC, leading to further splits. According to the UNHCR, there are approximately 500-1000 armed rebels still in the bush, although the number is hard to verify.

Since GOS increased its administrative presence, there have been relatively few clashes. Even though there is no comprehensive peace treaty, a state of no war and no peace exists. The GOS has announced an end to hostilities and encouraged refugees to return. Nevertheless, there are numerous obstacles to normalization, including landmines and approximately 11,000 refugees and 40,000 IDPs. Many community based organizations and NGOs are working at the grassroots level to facilitate reconciliation and a grassroots peace process, but coordination has been haphazard and there has been no evaluation of the impact of donor activities.

III. The USAID Response

A. USAID/Senegal Program

To respond to the needs of a regional population affected by an ongoing 20 year, low-level civil conflict, USAID/Senegal initiated the Casamance Special Objective (SpO2) in 1999. Its goal was to establish:

“Improved enabling conditions for peace via economic, social and political, development in support of the peace process.”

Assumptions: The SpO was based on the following premises:

- 1) In a conflict zone, failure to meet basic economic and social needs perpetuates conflict;
- 2) The lack of local peace-building mechanisms perpetuates conflict.

Hypothesis: USAID thus determined *that* a targeted development program could have a positive impact on reducing the conflict *if*:

- 1) economic and social conditions are improving, such that targeted populations/beneficiaries now have a vested interest in peacebuilding;
- 2) these populations/beneficiaries have access to peacebuilding mechanisms.

In summary, improved economic and social conditions, especially improved livelihoods, would encourage reconciliation and lead to an end to the conflict.

To develop specific program options, USAID/Senegal analyzed key elements of the conflict, including its, stage and intensity, the developmental status of target populations, cultural factors, political realities, and available program resources.. This analysis led to the development of four program components:

1. economic well being
2. local capacity building
3. improved living conditions
4. prevention and mitigation of conflict (See Annex 1 for the results framework with key and sub-key results)

These components constituted a two-pronged, multi-sector approach, allowing USAID to address the Casamance conflict both directly and indirectly through the following activities:

1. Direct Conflict-Related Activities:

- conflict resolution at the grassroots level (e.g., between villages);
- youth leadership training;
- traditional methods of peacebuilding;
- facilitation of high-level political meetings.

2. Indirect Traditional Development Activities:

- microfinance;
- income generation;

- private sector;
- agriculture/NRM;
- infrastructure rehabilitation;
- improved health/education services.

Significantly, all indirect activities have had an explicit peacebuilding component, except for one project targeting the private sector. (See Annex 2 for selected results to date).

B. USAID/WARP Program

USAID/WARP funds programs in the Gambia and Guinea Bissau that address cross-border issues associated with the conflict. These activities focus on improving the lives of refugees and their host communities and improving cross-border communication and interaction between villagers. Because population movements in the region are fluid, these programs were designed to compliment the SpO approach and have a positive influence on the Casamance conflict.

C. Measuring Program Impact

Given SpO2's results to date (see Annex 2) and the declining intensity of the conflict in the Casamance, the goal of this evaluation is to determine if there is a relationship between them. This same framework will be applied to the WARP programs.

More specifically, the evaluation will pose and answer a number of questions related to the aforementioned relationship. What, for example, are "improved enabling conditions for peace?" Were the program activities effective? What is the impact, and the relative importance, of each activity? How should the role of external factors be evaluated? How can causality be attributed and appraised? Is the timeframe for results and impact too long/short?

This evaluation is being commissioned to address these questions in order to test the hypothesis noted in section III-A. The following section discusses these and related questions in greater detail.

IV. Objectives/Evaluation Questions

The following is an illustrative outline of the required types/subject areas for evaluation questions, which are divided among three areas: 1) activity level, 2) SpO management and strategy, and 3) relationship between development activities and achieving peace. Evaluation questions are not limited to those listed below. It is expected that the Evaluation Team will finalize research questions. It is also anticipated that the Evaluation Team will bring additional expertise to bear on framing the evaluation to attain the maximum amount of useful information while balancing time and budgetary constraints.

I) Activity Level:

- 1) Did the SpO2's chosen activities have a positive impact on peacebuilding within the context of the Casamance conflict? (Use a purposive sampling of project sites from all the 13 SpO2 activities and the 2 WARP activities)

- 2) Did activities meet the needs of sampled beneficiaries of the SpO & WARP programs? (Disaggregate by gender, youth/non-youth, & IDPs/refugees/persons who remained, and geographic distribution of beneficiaries. Use survey.)
- 3) Was activity design appropriate to meeting both the 3 KIRs and the key needs of intended beneficiaries? Review baseline used for the design and constraints at the time of the design.
- 4) Did SpO and WARP activities separately bring any unintended results, positive and/or negative? (If yes, describe them and explain the causes)
- 5) Did SpO and WARP activity implementers collaborate for maximum impact?

II) Management & Strategic Level:

- 1) Were the processes used in meeting the SpO2 and WARP goals at both the activity and strategic levels efficient, in terms of funding levels and the LOP?
- 2) Were these processes and the Strategy itself responsive to changes in the Casamance conflict situation, or are there alternative strategies that might have been more effective?
- 3) To what degree are impacts sustainable in terms of continual progress toward reaching a peace treaty and continued improvement in the quality of life?
- 4) Was the monitoring and evaluation mechanism used to manage the two WARP funded programs effective?
- 5) Was there a clear and effective progression from the SOW on RFA/RFP/Task Order to the winning recipient's program description to the program outcomes in the final reports?
- 6) What are the strengths and weaknesses of the SpO2 strategy design and implementation?

III) Development Hypothesis:

- 1) Did the Casamance SpO program contribute to creating an enabling environment and helping to mitigate the Casamance conflict, particularly in terms of, but not limited to, the peace process? And if so, how and to what extent.

V. Methods & Procedures

It is expected that the evaluation team will bring expertise to best use existing methodology and design appropriate tools. Evaluation components will include, but are not limited to:

1. USAID project document review

USAID will provide the evaluation team with the documents prior to the beginning of the evaluation:

- 1999 Report on Analysis of Conflict
- Performance monitoring data over the life of the project
- GAO Audit Report
- Triennial Review Analytical Document
- Final reports and activity final evaluations from activities (most recent trimester reports on current activities)

- List of other donor programs active in the Casamance
 - SpO and WARP implementation documents, such as:
 - Key strategy design papers
 - RFAs/RFPs/Task Orders
 - Program descriptions, budgets, indicators and other instrument information
2. Content Analysis of Archives of the CASAGROUP listserv and other pertinent documents sharing valuable insight into the nature and evolution of the Casamance conflict .
 3. Fieldwork
 - Purposeful sampling of a minimum of 3 project sites and their beneficiaries per implementing partner (for both SpO2 and WARP activities), designed to represent all activity sectors. Attention given to geographic distribution.
 - Interviews with a comparable number of randomly selected non-intervention villages, towns, and/or city neighborhoods as a comparison group
 - Interviews with all implementing partner organizations at the regional level
 - Interviews with key GOS and MFDC representatives
 - Mapping of USAID activities to areas where conflict occurred
 4. Evaluation tools
 - Identification and development of measurement indicators and tools to gauge impacts of both direct peacebuilding activities and more traditional development initiatives, such as microfinance, private sector development, etc.
 - surveys
 - focus and/or group meetings
 - key informant interviews

VI. Deliverables

1. Operational work plan within 3 weeks of evaluation start date.
 - a. Research design with refined key questions and sub-issues within 3 weeks of evaluation start date. To be approved by USAID/Senegal.
2. Initial presentation of the evaluation mission & methodology to pertinent mission staff.
3. Oral presentation of initial findings, conclusions, and recommendations
4. Draft report that includes responses to all questions as agreed upon in the research design
5. Final report, which will include the following sections:
 - findings;
 - conclusions;
 - recommendations on the Senegal mission's new strategy design, the WARP mission's activity design and implementation, the integration of regionally targeted programs, and other areas relevant to the SpO2.

VII. Team Composition

An illustrative example would be as follows. However, if other configurations will work, the team can provide suggestions.

COP/Lead evaluator: who has extensive experience and expertise in evaluation design and implementation, with experience evaluating conflict programs. COP must have demonstrated understanding of USAID procedures and strategic framework models.

Technical evaluator(s): who has a combination of technical expertise in development programs with conflict resolution components and monitoring and evaluation knowledge. Must have demonstrated knowledge of development and humanitarian programming in conflict zones. *(This person will come from the CMM Office)*

Local evaluator: who has experience in evaluating development programs implemented in Senegal and preferably who has worked in the technical implementation of a development program in Senegal. Has experience living and working in the Casamance, or who can demonstrate an in-depth understanding of the Casamance conflict. Preferably speaks at least one of the local Casamance languages.

University Intern: a senior level graduate student who is studying development programs, conflict resolution, the Casamance, or related subject. Preferable speaks at least one of the local Casamance languages. Has experience in using questionnaires and/or other interviewing tools.


VII. Logistics

An illustrative time line for a 10.5-week evaluation, beginning on or about July 11 2005, would be as follows:

2.0 weeks	literature review and creation of research design (not in Senegal)
.5 week	USAID document review and listserv archives review (in Dakar)
3.5 weeks	field work
2.5 weeks	analysis and draft report preparation for submission to USAID
1.0 week	draft report circulation at USAID with comments sent to evaluator
1.0 week	final report writing and submission to USAID

Total evaluation time is 10.5 weeks, including preparatory work, field work and report writing.

Annex 2 Results Framework



Annex 3 List of People Interviewed

USAID-Senegal

Gardinier, Olivier, Director
Lane, Kathryn, SpO Coordinator
Coly Lamine, SpO Assistant Coordinator

Africaire-

Dean, James, Country Representative
Diallo Gorgui Sène, program Officer
Samb Ousseynou, Assistant

Padco

OyiniolaYinka
Bassene Mathias

Catholic Relief Service

Diouf Ahmed - Chef d'Antenne
Kao Fernando - Agriculture Project Manager
Sagna Francois - Project Assistant

AJAEDO

Diallo Alimou, Coordinator
Ehemba Pascal, Project Coordinator
Campa Auguste, Badji Mathias

Handicap International

Fall Doudou, Project Manager- Education
Martinez Philippe, Regional Coordinator
Sané Mbaye, Project manager, Bignona

APRAN

Keita Demba, Director

Enterprise Works (Friday 10 feb)

Bassène Maurice - Cashew
Diémé Alioune, Microcredit
Manga Hyacinthe - Irrigation
Munro Tate, Intern

World Education

Sarr Abdul, Director

ASACASE

Boissy Jérôme Nicolas, Chef du PIJED
Diatta Sidiya, Vice chef
Fickou Sadio, M&E

ADRA

Dabo Yarba Mohamed
Ba Damacoula
Lue Dodou Bossé, Field Projects Officer, Ingore
Monteiro José Joao
Gomés Maurice

Concern

Hosford Nigel, Project Manager
Sonko Ebrima, Project Manager ESSU

St Josef Family Farm

Marcel Badji

CACEC

Da Silva Eusobio
Mané Lang

CASADES

Diawara Bassa

Enfance et Paix

Sadio Mamadou Lamine

Kabonkatoor

Coly Marguerite
Sagna Ndèye Marie
Diédhiou Diatou
Badiane Marie A.

HI-mine

Gonzalès Manuel, Project Manager
Ndione Babacar, Head of Operations

List of Participants-Workshops

Badiane Aminata Niane, USAID-Senegal
 Cissokho N'Deye Baté Sociologist
 Diatta Alex Aurélien, USAID-Senegal
 Diop, Cheikh, Consultant CIDA
 Fournier Henry, Head of Delegation ICRC
 Lane Kathryn, USAID-Senegal

Coly Lamine, USAID-Senegal
 Seynabou Maal Cisse, Usoforal
 Sagna Ndeye Marie, Kabonketoor
 Sarr Abdul, World Education
 Diouf Ameth, CRS
 Müller Franck, Coopération Française
 Koné Mamadou, AGADA

Annex 4 List of Projects visited

Departement	Village	Activity type	US AGENCY	Partner	Date of visit
Ziguinchor	Mpack	Reconstruction (houses, wells)	Senegal Mission Senegal	CRS/Raddho/Apran	05/02/2006
Ziguinchor	Mpack	Microfinance Reconstruction (houses, wells)	Senegal Mission Senegal	CRS/Raddho/Apran	05/02/2006
Ziguinchor	Mandina Mancagne	Microfinance Reconstruction (houses, wells)	Senegal Mission Senegal	CRS/Raddho/Apran	05/02/2006
Zingunchor	Mandina Mancagne	Microfinance Reconstruction (houses, wells)	Senegal Mission Senegal	CRS/Raddho/Apran	05/02/2006
Oussouye	Kandialang	Refugee return mobilization	Senegal Mission Senegal	CRS/Raddho/Apran World Education	05/02/2006
Oussouye	Effoc	Stress management	Senegal Mission Senegal	AJAEDO World Education	06/02/2006
Oussouye	Effoc	Canoes	Senegal Mission Senegal	AJAEDO World Education	06/02/2006
Oussouye	Effoc	Cultural weekends	Senegal Mission Senegal	AJAEDO Handicap	06/02/2006
Ziguinchor	Zinguichor	Land mine victims Reconstruction, AGR, Refugee return	Senegal Mission Senegal	International Handicap	07/02/2006
Bignona	Bignona	Land mine victims Reconstruction, AGR, Refugee return	Senegal Mission Senegal	International	07/02/2006
Ziguinchor	Zinguinchor	Workshop	Senegal Mission Senegal	APRAN	08/02/2006
Ziguinchor	Zinguinchor	Workshop	Senegal Mission Senegal	PADCO	08/02/2006
Guinea Bissau	Chérif Counda	Market Gardens	WARP Mission Senegal	ADRA	09/02/2006
Guinea Bissau	Ingore	Backery	WARP Mission Senegal	ADRA	09/02/2006
Guinea Bissau	Karban	Agriculture	WARP Mission Senegal	ADRA	09/02/2006
Gambia	Sangajor	Health post	WARP Mission Senegal	Concern	11/02/2006

Gambia	Bwiam	School	WARP Mission	Concern	11/02/2006
Gambia	Bwiam	Peace building St Josefs Family Farm	Warp Mission	Concern	11/02/2006
Gambia	Bwiam	Agricultural training St Josefs Family Farm	Warp Mission	Concern	11/02/2006
Gambia	Bwiam	Market Garden	WARP Mission	Concern	11/02/2006
Kolda	Samine	Youth Association	Senegal Mission	Africare	13/02/2006
Ziguinchor	Zinguinchor	Cashew factory	Senegal Mission	EnterPrise Works	13/02/2006
Ziguinchor	Zinguinchor	Peace building, Refugee return	Senegal Mission	CACEC	13/02/2006
Kolda	Sedhiou	Training	Senegal Mission	Enfance et Paix	14/02/2006
Ziguinchor	Tilène	Seed project Peace building	Senegal Mission	CASADES	14/02/2006
		Seed Project	Mission	Kabonkétor	14/02/2006

Annex 5 Results of Workshop Mapping

Key Events/trends	Rating
Activité militaire accrue, recrutement par MFDC dans popu (90)	9
Population fed up with violence (2000)	9
Demonstrations at the gouvernance : mid 80s :	8
<u>Decreasing popular support to MFDC (end 90s)</u>	<u>8</u>
Fragmentation of rebel fronts (2001)	8
New regime (2000)	7
<u>Land ownership conflicts (law, changes in owners) 60s</u>	<u>6</u>
Forced population movement	6
Accalmie, army on defensive attitude (2002)	6
Cristallisation of identity (1980)	5
<u>Massive refugee returns (2002-2003)</u>	<u>5</u>

<u>More circulation of individuals (2003)</u>	<u>5</u>
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Increase of assaults (2004)	5
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Peculiarities in Mapping 1

Only consequence of peace agreement is increase in banditism

ANRAC created (not consequential?)	3
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Donors leave (no consequence)	3
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Mapping 2

<u>Return of the donors (2001)</u>	<u>11</u>
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<u>Basic infrastructure rehabilitated</u>	<u>8</u>
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<u>Isolation ("enclavement")</u>	<u>7</u>
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<u>Opening of the conflict to the public sphere</u> (but only consequence)	<u>7</u>
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<u>Affirmative position of civil society</u>	<u>7</u>
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<u>Improvement of peace efforts</u>	<u>7</u>
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Creation of the Northern Front	7
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Appearance of mines	7
---------------------	---

Return of populations (2001)	7
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<u>Land ownership conflicts (law, changes in owners)</u> in 60s	<u>6</u>
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Events of 89 (murders, coup in Guinea)	6
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Attika II, 1983	6
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Population fed up	6
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Trésor de guerre	5
Implantation du Club Med en 1973	4

Peculiarities in Mapping 2

Population displacements in the 90s	2
Mine accidents	0
Donors pull out	3
Massive involvement of women	3
ANRAC created	3

Annex 6 Literature Review of Evaluation Tools

Introduction

There are presently few developed methodologies for the evaluation of conflict resolution¹⁸. The challenge for analysts is to find a method which can be commonly used by field personnel.

Unfortunately many of the evaluation approaches currently in use in other fields cannot be adapted for the evaluation of conflict resolution, where the context and need is constantly changing, there is often a lack of baseline data, and the issues under evaluation - for example changes in people's perception and attitudes - are difficult to quantify. In conflict programming, opportunity is an important element, and implicit forms of steering are prevalent.

"Where methodologies exist, they are used by a small segment of stakeholders and often it is an ad hoc process conforming to the needs of the moment and limited by lack of skills, understanding and resources." (Church et al 2003). Moreover the temptation, for reasons of resources and complexity of the subject, is to concentrate on the delivery of the intended outputs, and not analyse rigorously the subsequent impacts on the conflict, usually formulating an assumption that a contribution is made.

However organisations which specialize in this field are beginning to see it as their fiduciary responsibility to generate guidelines on the design of objectives, indicators, and monitoring systems to enable evaluations to verify the quality of the outcomes of individual projects. In the following sections we review how this has been attempted.

¹⁸ The work is called variously conflict management, peace building, conflict transformation, conflict resolution, conflict prevention, peacemaking or reconciliation. The purpose of this review is not to define the different terms and conflict resolution will be used as a common term.

The narrative school of thought (K. Bush)

Two research projects have respectively captured the shared experiences in the field of conflict resolution evaluation by bringing together peace building practitioners, funding agencies and evaluators for workshops and discussions (Anderson et al 2003, Church et al 2003). These projects identified some of the key challenges in evaluating conflict resolution interventions. Both projects offer valuable recommendations on how to measure outcomes and impact of conflict resolution projects

Yet another evaluation tool is found in the area of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA). PCIA is one research area that is evaluating the impacts of more traditional development projects on both the structure and processes that promote peace and those that increase the prospects for violence. One of the most significant attempts to develop a workable PCIA methodology has been Kenneth Bush's "A Measure of Peace" (1998). It relies fundamentally on narrative descriptions of conflict.

This approach is particularly useful if the purpose is to evaluate the impact of more traditional development project in the field of for example health and education on peace building. PCIA is the undermining the sharp demarcation between development and peace building projects. For some PCIA practitioners *all* development projects, not just the overtly political ones in areas of good governance, have a potential or actual peace building impact (for research on PCIA see Berghof Research Center's "Handbook for Conflict Transformation").

Bush (1998) defines PCIA as: A means of evaluating (ex post facto) and anticipating (ex ante, as far as possible) the impacts of proposed and completed development projects on: 1) those structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation of violent conflict, and; 2) those structure and processes that increase the likelihood that conflict will be dealt with through violent means.

In pursuing post-project evaluations, Bush identifies four broad areas in which to explore the wider peace building impacts of a more traditional development project:

1. Did the project produce substantial or politically significant changes in access to individual or collective material and non-material resources?
2. Did the project create, exacerbate or mitigate socio-economic tensions?
3. Did the project produce substantial changes in the material basis of economic sustenance or food security?
4. Did the project produce challenges to or changes in content of or control over existing political, economic and/or social systems

These four areas point to usefully questions that could be addressed when measuring impact of especially more development oriented projects on peace building. The question of the link

between individual projects and peace building or conflict resolution on the broad level of the broad is however still outstanding.

As the report by Anderson (p14, 2003). states, “most agencies neglect to question how their discrete programs contribute to progress on the bigger picture, to ‘Peace Writ Large’” The issue of how to evaluate the link between peace building on the local level and broad level of society was key in the “Reflecting of Peace Practice” project by Anderson.

Narrative explanation, however is problematic mainly because, in order to convince, the method revolves around personal selection from a wide range of evidence, and on the questionable projection of individual project level actions on to the national level¹⁹.

The Do No Harm School (M. Anderson)

One way to develop more concrete indicators emerged from the “Do No Harm” project (Anderson 1999), which was a project that involved a number of humanitarian and development assistance agencies seeking to understand how in some cases their aid reinforce inter-group conflicts.

It emerged from this project that dividers and connectors provide specific indicators of aid’s impacts on conflict. The advantage of understanding conflict in terms of dividers and connectors is that these embody observable aspects of inter-group relationships.

It can be observed if inter-group divisions are worsening or abating. If for example inequality in access to housing has divided groups, changes in access can be assessed. The rise and fall of inter-group tension is also observable in people’s behaviors. Do people consider some roads safe and use them or are they considered dangerous and do they consequently try to avoid using them. Do people move freely across boundaries or stay within the confines of their own groups?

It can be observed whether people are increasing or decreasing their use of connectors such as roads and markets. If trade for example has been a connector, are people still (or again) meeting in markets or do they avoid them? Do they send their children to schools together, do they build new separate schools or do they keep children at home?

Dividers and connectors provide a focus for observable indicators of inter-group relationships and the change in them. However it is not possible to verify with any level of certainty whether the dividers and connectors identified are the key ones. Here again a narrative method has to be introduced, with the weaknesses mentioned above.

A “Disaggregation” Approach (C. Church, R. Goldwyn, L. Zandvliet)

¹⁹ Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools, Synthesis Report“, DFID, March 2004, Evaluation Report EV 647

A proposal for an overarching framework of analysis for conflict resolution evaluation has been drawn up in 2005. It is not a generic set of criteria to evaluate all interventions but an instrument to guide thinking before starting an evaluation

The framework is structured around three thematic areas which are again divided into three specific aspects of an intervention that the evaluation can seek to assess:

Goal and assumptions	Why and how is the agency conducting this particular intervention?	-Appropriateness consideration -Theoretical Analysis -Strategic Review
Process Accountability	How was the intervention operationalized?	-Management and Adm -Cost-Accountability -Process Appraisal
Range of results	What were the short and long term results of the intervention?	-Output -Outcomes -Impact

The framework offers some illustrative questions within each aspect to provide greater clarity in terms of practical application. Questions such as these can be used as guidelines when drawing up questionnaires or interview guides.

It looks at the different aspects of an intervention that a conflict resolution evaluation can seek to assess. One evaluation will rarely seek to address all aspects of an intervention. For the purpose of this review we will elaborate a bit further on the aspect of impact. Impacts are here defined as consequences of intervention outcomes. Consequently an impact evaluation will seek to determine the consequences of an intervention's outcomes on a conflict situation.

Another related approach, the "Reflecting of Peace Practice" (RPP) project (steered by some researchers at the Collaborative for Development Associates in Boston), stressed the importance of assessing effectiveness of an intervention on two levels:

-The program level: on this level it is assessed if an activity is achieving its intended goal (this could involve an examination of the project design, the implementation and its immediate results)

-The Peace Writ Large level: at this level it is assessed if a program in meeting its specific program goals makes a contribution to the bigger picture understood as changes at the broad level of society

It is commonly agreed by the experts participating in the RPP project that agencies are not directly responsible for bringing "Peace Writ Large". They are however responsible for monitoring whether there is progress towards "Peace Writ Large" and whether the programs

they are running are making a tangible contribution to that peace. This is instead based on a narrative explanation balancing the pros and cons.

Through the broad consultations in the RPP research project, it was possible to identify general criteria (not localized indicators) by which to assess the contribution of different activities on conflict resolution. Four criteria of effectiveness were identified as having universal usefulness for impact assessment. They were found to apply across contexts:

1. The effort caused the participants and communities to develop their own initiatives for peace
2. The effort results in the creation or reform of political institutions to handle grievances that fuel the conflict
3. The effort prompts people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to violence
4. The effort results in an increase in peoples security

The four criteria are additive which means that an intervention is more effective the more criteria it meets. Moreover it is stressed that a change is more significant if it is sooner rather than later, if it is sustained over time and if it is proportional to and on the same scale as the conflict.

The RPP criteria are useful general indicators of success especially when deciding if a project has contributed to peace at the broad level of society. They are however general.

It is possible to say whether a program has succeeded in meeting its intended outcomes (for example achieving some change in attitudes and behavior among a target group), and tempting but mistaken to extrapolate just on the basis of this information whether this has had a decisive impact on the course of the conflict on the “Peace Writ Large” level. Conversely it is mistaken to conclude that a program was ineffective because the conflict was not resolved. This is what can be called the fallacy of attribution.

This was for example one of the most striking findings of the “Evaluation of the Macedonia OTI program” evaluation (Social Impact and Channel Research 2004). Even though the intended outcomes, which were here measured quantitatively, had been reached (here to develop trust between ethnic communities), the evaluation led to the conclusion that it was not possible to say whether the program had been effective.

It was argued in this report (as had been done in a previous evaluation report on behalf of the European Commission in Liberia in 1999²⁰) that an intermediary objective was missing (i.e. an objective situated between the specific objective or project purpose and the general objectives of conflict resolution). This led to the development of the cascade of objectives method.

²⁰ Evaluation of EC Rehabilitation Activities, APT Consult, 1999. Case Study Liberia.

The UK Government's Public Service Agreement Approach

The UK Government, through the application of the public policy targets to its Conflict Prevention Pools, has sought to overcome the difficulty of attribution in another manner, by introducing quantitative targets of a general nature, and some country specific narratives, drawn from the DFID country strategies. Changes in the measurements of these targets would allow the UK Government to deduce that it had been effective.

The consultants working on the evaluation of the Pools have found three broad reasons not to use this measurement of performance (related to the Public Service Agreements, of which all UK Ministries have four or five underpinning their accountability), especially in the field of foreign policy :

1. The quantitative measurement is dependent on good quality sources, and on a clear relationship between UK outputs/results and outcomes/impacts. Conflicts generate inherently contentious streams of information, and contrary to DFID practice in the economic sphere there are no national data sets. The method as it is currently formulated requires use of the SIPRI, IISS, USCR (US Committee for Refugees) and UNHCR data. This data is not necessarily up to date, and is in some instances guided by institutional bias²¹. It is very difficult to relate war stress such as population movements, to levels of violence (increasing number of besieged populations, for example, will reduce displacement).
2. The qualitative measurement of reduction in potential sources of future conflict was introduced to mitigate the weaknesses of the quantitative targets. It includes the success of the UK in mobilising an effective international response. This is however very difficult to aggregate, especially since the definition of the causes of war is more closely related to the position of the actors and to their responsibility²², and is most often based on the conflict prevention strategy documents which are not of a consistent quality.
3. The Public Service Agreement target is not limited to the Pools, but covers the work of three Departments, and is the responsibility of two Ministers, according to a geographical division (DFID for sub-Saharan Africa, FCO for outside sub-Saharan Africa). A vast array of measures can be said to serve the purpose of avoiding the unwanted impact of violence on human life, including those controlled by the Secretary of Defence, whose officials have described for example, not illogically, airport anti-terrorist security training as serving the PSA.

²¹ To give but one example, even in the relatively measurable issue of repatriation figures for Burundi refugees from Tanzania back to Burundi in 2002 UNHCR has provided diverging figures from its Branch Office in Bujumbura and that in Dar Es Salaam.

²² Within the active body of literature we recommend « On the Causes of War », Hidemi Suganami, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1996. He argues that « the most (we) can endeavour to arrive at is an inter-subjective consensus, among professional historians and their readers, that their story is the more persuasive – or at least not less so – than the pre-existing ones... Its persuasiveness may in turn be judged in the light, among other things, of breadth and judiciousness in its available use of evidence, and, more broadly, its coherence with other well-accepted facts and stories » which, he notes, is fragmentary and cannot be tested (page 207).

In some cases the contribution to the reduction of conflict are so varied as to be barely comparable.

This evaluation has consequently not followed the quantitative target approach, even if supported with good narratives explaining the causes of conflict.

Channel's Pilot method 1: The Cascade of Objectives (E. Brusset)

Another pilot study has been carried out by Channel Research for Search for Common Ground and subsequently USAID in Burundi. In both cases the aim was to assess the impact of Search for Common Ground and Global Rights programmes.

On the basis on a TV program for children in Macedonia "Developing Better Methods of Evaluation For Conflict Prevention/Resolution" (2004), the first study was to provide a new body of knowledge to verify the peace-building value achieved by conflict prevention. It was based on the clarification of intermediary objectives.

Both "Do No Harm" and the "Reflecting on Peace Practice" (Anderson 1999, 2003) have shown that people in the field are a critical source of information about, and confirmation of, impacts. People in the situation where programs are carried out have opinions (and, often, valid opinions) about impacts and causation. They attribute outcomes to particular events.

However the danger of "just asking people" is that one uses a purely narrative approach that is not easily verifiable. Developing and testing an approach that links a project's output to the contribution to society is required in a manner which can be verified by all the stakeholders.

Four evaluative questions were presented to a range of external independent actors which are perceived to be influential in each area. These cover four intermediary impacts before reaching the general level of conflict resolution:

1. Strength: How influential is the programme in the society, compared to other actors? Which trends or drivers of peace and conflict does it influence?
2. To catch people's imagination (short term impact): Has there been a propagation of new social models, which are attractive and are reproduced and emulated further within the society? What are these models, how attractive are they? Were they proposed at the right time, or have they allowed the organisation to buy time while contradictory messages of incitations to violence and tension were being spread?
3. To create new modes of interaction (medium term impact): Have the activities allowed groups which did not previously have contact to talk to each other, either through representatives, or between communities? Have these contacts been of a new nature? Were they noticed as important by a significant number of people?
4. Capacities (long term impact): What institutions have been created, for example new radio stations? What personnel have been trained and what skills have been improved that will allow

the society to respond to any new upsurge in violence? How sustainable are these new capacities?

These types of objectives are taken in order of increasing range and longevity of impact. They are located in a slightly higher plane than the program outcomes, and link these outcomes to general resolution.

The pilot project by Channel Research (2004) then set out to apply two small scale research models (only one was used in Burundi):

Social surveys: the surveys concentrated on the changes sought through the project in the population's attitudes, intentions and behaviour, in favour of conflict resolution.

Cascade of Objectives: The next step was to define whether there were strong or weak links between the programme outcomes, and the intermediary impacts. This was done through workshops with aid agency staff, usually in the form of a contradictory process.

The interviews were carried out during the evaluations in Macedonia and in Burundi to detect recurring patterns of answers in each dimension. The degree to which the respondents may or may not be representative was judged as of less importance than elements in these patterns which were quite clear and consistent.

The evaluators felt however that these objectives, which created a cascade between outputs, outcomes, intermediary impact and overall impact, still suffered from issues of attribution. At each level the influence of the programme evaluated decreased, and other influences had to be taken into account. The proportions of influence, or spheres of influence of different actors, were hard to gauge. It was not possible to attribute effectiveness to the interventions where there were many factors at play apart from their programmes.

Pilot Method 2: mapping used in the present evaluation (E. Brusset)

In the face of these difficulties there is an aid bias which tends to shift attention away from influence toward the tools of the logical framework analysis, and to project cycle management. The way in which a project is inserted into its context, and the mapping of influence around it, is often relegated to background narrative analysis. The net result of this focus on internal coherence leads to a loss of perception of strategic opportunities, as reflected in a recently published report by the UK:

“While partners had analysed some options for action, we found no high-level maps or models designed explicitly to drive partners' actions and co-ordinate joint working and so make intervention effective. For example, in most cases, the range of potential factors influencing

results and their interaction, were not fully developed. Without this information it had proven difficult to set stretching but achievable targets.”²³

The present methodology is based precisely on starting from the mapping. The mapping of the conflict dynamic and its trends and events and how these trends and events were affected by the program will be based on the Strategic Assessment Method (SAM).

the evaluation team has used a previously tested, two pronged method of evaluation:

- **Conflict mapping:** workshops aim at identifying events and trends that define the dynamics of the conflict. The method proposed here requires a group of experts to draw up a map of trends and events which increase the probability of conflict or of peace, and seek to draw the links which lead from one to the other. This includes for example in the case of Macedonia the criminalisation of the economy (a trend) and the killing of policemen by Albanian groups (an event). Arrows indicate when events and trends increase or decrease the probability of the others occurring. “Nodal points” on which many arrows concentrate will then emerge, indicating areas of priority intervention. These are then classified into two categories: those which are amenable to influence by the actor concerned, and those which are not. Those amenable to influence are then put into relation with the existing programme objectives.
- **Outcome definition and linkage:** the field work and interviews of staff allow the team to elucidate the impact of the program by defining the quality of the outcomes achieved. These are then tracked back to the conflict dynamics by assessing the duration and the extent of the impact.

The result of the convergence of these two methods is the creation of a plausible link between the programmes and the conflict - In other words those verifiable links that exist between strategically important events and trends, and the programme outcomes.

Small scale social surveys, if not possible for practical reasons, must be replaced by semi-structured interview with staff and beneficiaries in order to define outcomes of the projects. These outcomes will be tracked back to the conflict dynamics as identified through the SAM workshops.

The result of the convergence of these two methods is the definition of the relevance of the impacts which create a good link between the programs and the conflict - In other words those verifiable links that exist between strategically important events and trends, and the program outcomes. These good links we will call Valued Impacts.

The evaluation asks whether the impact was relevant (were there many good links?), and effective (what evidence is there of duration, extent and frequency?).

²³ National Audit Office « Joint Targets » October 2005.

Effectiveness analysis is based on the significance or rating of the answers to the following questions concerning the linkages between the key events and trends and the outcomes and impact:

D: Duration: was the impact temporary and how long will it probably last?

E: Extent: depth and breadth of impact, probably in population terms?

F: Frequency: how often did impact occur over a year? If not time bound (for example capacity building)

A three tier system of high (3), medium (2) and low (1) can be used.

The assessment of the significance of impact will be done through the following equation:

$$\text{Significance} = D \times E \times F$$

This rating of significance will provide the basis for an estimation of the effectiveness of the program. This is defined as the gap between intended significance and actual significance.

A rating such as this can more easily be verified by all stakeholders as long as the basis on which the rating is done is agreed to by all involved stakeholders before the start of an evaluation.

Conclusion

An important challenge when evaluating the outcome and impact of conflict resolution projects is the lack of indicators of success, and more particularly the straitjacket of planning by objectives. At present peace research do not provide a set of solutions for general use. This, we propose, is due to the limitations of western thinking when operating in very fluid environments.

This evaluation in effect represents an effort to move away from the Greek or western tradition of thinking as central the strength of the link from means to ends. An ideal is set in objective, and technique governs the way in which this is achieved. In evaluation terms what we propose here allows one to move away from the logical framework.

The logical framework requires a precise definition of the final desired end state, a state of peace (for example free elections held regularly). Such a conflict condition is highly problematic for outside actors to define, especially for aid agencies with very limited means, where the specific objective may seem very small compared to the scale of the problems in a country.

The Mapping approach proposed here is in a way more akin to eastern thinking, which concentrates on the trends that will determine an event, and on achieving a position of influence

among those trends, rather than forcing the event. The conflict should evolve toward its own resolution. The indicators for the Mapping assessment can vary widely²⁴, but should be based closely on the nature of the organisation concerned.

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²⁴ Some indicators can be drawn from company valuation methods, such as Intellectual Capital Management, the Balanced Scorecard, or derived from objectives such as in the case of the MoD whose focus on people and organisation leads it to review investment in training, and retention rates for example.

Annex 7 Comparison of villages reconstructed and mined areas

Source: Handicap International

Villages	Communautés rurales	Nombre de maisons	Partenaires	Données d'enquêtes provisoires
Saré séný	Tankanto (K)	2	MJPI	Non disponible
Saré soubang	Tankanto (K)	6	MJPI	Non disponible
Saré koutia	Tankanto (K)	1	MJPI	Non disponible
Saré demboulou	Tankanto (K)	1	MJPI	Non disponible
Saré diamboulou	Tankanto (K)	2	MJPI	Non disponible
Koumbidia	Tankanto (K)	1	MJPI	Non
Sinthian maligué	Tankanto (K)	1	MJPI	Non disponible
Saré yéro diao soutou	Tankanto (K)	6	MJPI	Non
Talléle	Tankanto (K)	1	MJPI	Non disponible
Saré hima	Tankanto (K)		MJPI	Non disponible
Oumoul kouré	Tankanto (K)		MJPI	Non
Saré wali diao	Médina El Hadj (K)	7	MJPI	Non
Médina bocar	Médina El Hadj (K)	2	MJPI	Non disponible
Sinthian amadou soukel	Médina El Hadj (K)		MJPI	Non disponible
Sanka	Médina El Hadj (K)		MJPI	Non disponible
Sous Total: 15	2	30		
Youtou	Santhiaba Manjacque (Z)	29	AJAEDO	Oui
Effoc	Santhiaba Manjacque (Z)	14	AJAEDO	Oui
Essaout	Santhiaba Manjacque (Z)	10	AJAEDO	Non disponible
Djirack	Santhiaba Manjacque (Z)	1	AJAEDO	Non disponible
Sous Total: 4	1	54		
Mpack	Boutoupa Camaracounda (Z)	42	RADDHO	Oui
Sous Total: 1	1	42		
Clonia	Djibanar (K)	2	AFE	Non disponible
Bafata Balante	Djibanar (K)	3	AFE	Oui
Singhère Baïnouck	Djibanar (K)	2	AFE	Oui
Singhhère Escale	Djibanar (K)	2	AFE	Oui
Sous Total: 4	1	9		
Sindian	Sindian (Z)	3	Caritas/Z	Non
Uniock	Sindian (Z)	3	Caritas/Z	Non disponible

Tankoron	Sindian (Z)	4	Caritas/Z	Non disponible
Diakoye BANGA	Sindian (Z)	1	Caritas/Z	Non disponible
Médjédje	Sindian (Z)	1	Caritas/Z	Non disponible
Kagnarou	Sindian (Z)	1	Caritas/Z	Non disponible
Kakème	Sindian (Z)	1	Caritas/Z	Non disponible
Sous Total: 7	1	14		
Samodji Mansa	Tanaf (K)	1	Caritas/K	Non disponible
Kandiénousoukoto	Tanaf (K)	1	Caritas/K	Non disponible
Saré Sambèle	Tanaf (K)	1	Caritas/K	Non disponible
Sinthou B. Demba	Tanaf (K)	1	Caritas/K	Non disponible
Lamèle	Tanaf (K)	1	Caritas/K	Non disponible
M.Ibrahi. DIALLO	Tanaf (K)	1	Caritas/K	Non disponible
Samodji Dinsé	Tanaf (K)	1	Caritas/K	Non disponible
Sototo	Tanaf (K)	1	Caritas/K	Non disponible
Farancounda	Tanaf (K)	1	Caritas/K	Non disponible
Saré Pathé	Tanaf (K)	1	Caritas/K	Non disponible
Fadioungar 2	Tanaf (K)	1	Caritas/K	Non disponible
Fadioungar 1	Tanaf (K)	1	Caritas/K	Non disponible
Diamaye	Tanaf (K)	1	Caritas/K	Non disponible
Kandiénousoucouto	Tanaf (K)	1	Caritas/K	Non disponible
Niagha	Niagha (K)	1	Caritas/K	Oui
Sinthiang Téné	Niagha (K)	1	Caritas/K	
Santandiang Yoba	Niagha (K)	1	Caritas/K	Non
Sinthiang Téné	Niagha (K)	1	Caritas/K	
Saré Sara Bouya	Niagha (K)	1	Caritas/K	Oui
Niagha	Niagha (K)	1	Caritas/K	
Saré Demba Diao	Niagha (K)	1	Caritas/K	Oui
Saré Lao	Niagha (K)	1	Caritas/K	Oui
Médina Saré Diao	Niagha (K)	1	Caritas/K	Oui
Médina Saré Diao	Niagha (K)	1	Caritas/K	
Saré Lao	Niagha (K)	1	Caritas/K	Oui
Saré Koundia	Niagha (K)	1	Caritas/K	
Saré Koundia	Niagha (K)	1	Caritas/K	Oui
Saré Dembané	Niagha (K)	1	Caritas/K	Oui
Sous Total: 28	2	28		
Diabicounda	Samine (K)	1	Enfance/Paix	Non
Sécounaya	Samine (K)	1	Enfance/Paix	Non disponible
Samine Escale	Samine (K)	3	Enfance/Paix	Oui
Sous Total: 3	1	5		

Faradiangto	Samine (K)	6	FADECBA 1ère	Non
Binaka	Samine (K)	2	FADECBA 1ère	Non disponible
Kanico	Samine (K)	5	FADECBA 1ère	Oui
Sincab Tilibo	Samine (K)	2	FADECBA 1ère	Non disponible
Thiéba	Samine (K)	1	FADECBA 1ère	Non disponible
Marseille	Samine (K)	1	FADECBA 1ère	Oui
Birmine	Samine (K)	1	FADECBA 1ère	Non
Sanou Sénégal	Samine (K)	5	FADECBA 1ère	Oui
Koussy	Samine (K)	1	FADECBA 1ère	Non
Bagnima	Samine (K)	2	FADECBA 1ère	Non
Soumbour	Samine (K)	2	FADECBA 1ère	Non disponible
Simbandi Balante	Samine (K)	1	FADECBA 1ère	Non
Sathioum	Samine (K)	3	FADECBA 1ère	Oui
Madina	Samine (K)	3	FADECBA 1ère	Non disponible
Thianaff	Samine (K)	5	FADECBA 1ère	Non
Adjing	Samine (K)	2	FADECBA 1ère	Non
Diaticounda	Diattacounda (K)	3	FADECBA 1ère	Non disponible
Sibana	Diattacounda (K)	2	FADECBA 1ère	Non disponible
Madya	Diattacounda (K)	4	FADECBA 1ère	Non disponible
Manécounda	Diattacounda (K)	1	FADECBA 1ère	Non
Sous Total: 20	2	52		
Goudomp	Goudomp (K)	1	FADECBA 2ème	Non
Thiamlé	Diattacounda (K)	6	FADECBA 2ème	Non disponible
Boutounghoul	Diattacounda (K)	6	FADECBA 2ème	Non disponible
Sincap Tildji	Diattacounda (K)	5	FADECBA 2ème	Oui
Sibana	Diattacounda (K)	4	FADECBA 2ème	
Thiéba	Diattacounda (K)	1	FADECBA 2ème	
Sémène	Diattacounda (K)	6	FADECBA	

			2ème
Sancadj	Diattacounda (K)	6	FADECBA 2ème
Thianaff	Samine (K)	1	FADECBA 2ème
Sanou Sénégal	Samine (K)	3	FADECBA 2ème
Adjing	Samine (K)	1	FADECBA 2ème
Koussy	Samine (K)	2	FADECBA 2ème
Sincap Tilibo	Samine (K)	1	FADECBA 2ème
Kanico	Samine (K)	3	FADECBA 2ème
Bagnima	Samine (K)	1	FADECBA 2ème
Marseille	Samine (K)	2	FADECBA 2ème
Birmine	Samine (K)	1	FADECBA 2ème
Bagui	Samine (K)	2	FADECBA 2ème
Faradiangto	Samine (K)	3	FADECBA 2ème
Samine Sanio	Samine (K)	2	FADECBA 2ème
Madya	Samine (K)	3	FADECBA 2ème
Djidadi Balante	Samine (K)	2	FADECBA 2ème
Sonoco	Samine (K)	3	FADECBA 2ème
Bafata	Samine (K)	2	FADECBA 2ème
Pirki	Samine (K)	1	FADECBA 2ème
Klonia	Samine (K)	1	FADECBA 2ème
Sous Total: 26	3	69	
Bafican	Nyassia (Z)	3	APRAN
Bacounoum	Nyassia (Z)	6	APRAN
Baséré	Nyassia (Z)	3	APRAN
Dialang	Nyassia (Z)	8	APRAN
Dioher	Nyassia (Z)	2	APRAN
Kailou	Nyassia (Z)	2	APRAN
Kaléane	Nyassia (Z)	1	APRAN
Sous Total: 7	1	25	

Oui

Oui

Village abandonné

Oui

Oui

Oui

Oui